on sense and the sensible-第12部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！




the　contradictory　of　the　above　hypothesis　（of　different　parts　of



Soul　remaining　engaged　in　simultaneous　perception　with　one　sense）　is



what　emerges　from　the　analogy＇；　while　if　the　two　parts　of　Soul



remain　separate；　the　analogy　of　the　eyes　will　fail；　＇for　of　these　some



one　is　really　formed＇。



　　Furthermore；　＇on　the　supposition　of　the　need　of　different　parts　of



Soul；　co…operating　in　each　sense；　to　discern　different　objects



coinstantaneously＇；　the　senses　will　be　each　at　the　same　time　one　and



many；　as　if　we　should　say　that　they　were　each　a　set　of　diverse



sciences；　for　neither　will　an　'activity'　exist　without　its　proper



faculty；　nor　without　activity　will　there　be　sensation。



　　But　if　the　Soul　does　not；　in　the　way　suggested　＇i。e。　with



different　parts　of　itself　acting　simultaneously＇；　perceive　in　one



and　the　same　individual　time　sensibles　of　the　same　sense；　a　fortiori



it　is　not　thus　that　it　perceives　sensibles　of　different　senses。　For　it



is；　as　already　stated；　more　conceivable　that　it　should　perceive　a



plurality　of　the　former　together　in　this　way　than　a　plurality　of



heterogeneous　objects。



　　If　then；　as　is　the　fact；　the　Soul　with　one　part　perceives　Sweet；



with　another；　White；　either　that　which　results　from　these　is　some



one　part；　or　else　there　is　no　such　one　resultant。　But　there　must　be



such　an　one；　inasmuch　as　the　general　faculty　of　sense…perception　is



one。　What　one　object；　then；　does　that　one　faculty　＇when　perceiving



an　object；　e。g。　as　both　White　and　Sweet＇　perceive？　＇None＇；　for



assuredly　no　one　object　arises　by　composition　of　these



＇heterogeneous　objects；　such　as　White　and　Sweet＇。　We　must　conclude；



therefore；　that　there　is；　as　has　been　stated　before；　some　one



faculty　in　the　soul　with　which　the　latter　perceives　all　its



percepts；　though　it　perceives　each　different　genus　of　sensibles



through　a　different　organ。



　　May　we　not；　then；　conceive　this　faculty　which　perceives　White　and



Sweet　to　be　one　qua　indivisible　＇sc。　qua　combining　its　different



simultaneous　objects＇　in　its　actualization；　but　different；　when　it　has



become　divisible　＇sc。　qua　distinguishing　its　different　simultaneous



objects＇　in　its　actualization？



　　Or　is　what　occurs　in　the　case　of　the　perceiving　Soul　conceivably



analogous　to　what　holds　true　in　that　of　the　things　themselves？　For　the



same　numerically　one　thing　is　white　and　sweet；　and　has　many　other



qualities；　＇while　its　numerical　oneness　is　not　thereby　prejudiced＇



if　the　fact　is　not　that　the　qualities　are　really　separable　in　the



object　from　one　another；　but　that　the　being　of　each　quality　is



different　＇from　that　of　every　other＇。　In　the　same　way　therefore　we



must　assume　also；　in　the　case　of　the　Soul；　that　the　faculty　of



perception　in　general　is　in　itself　numerically　one　and　the　same；　but



different　＇differentiated＇　in　its　being；　different；　that　is　to　say；　in



genus　as　regards　some　of　its　objects；　in　species　as　regards　others。



Hence　too；　we　may　conclude　that　one　can　perceive　＇numerically



different　objects＇　coinstantaneously　with　a　faculty　which　is



numerically　one　and　the　same；　but　not　the　same　in　its　relationship



＇sc。　according　as　the　objects　to　which　it　is　directed　are　not　the



same＇。



　　That　every　sensible　object　is　a　magnitude；　and　that　nothing　which　it



is　possible　to　perceive　is　indivisible；　may　be　thus　shown。　The



distance　whence　an　object　could　not　be　seen　is　indeterminate；　but　that



whence　it　is　visible　is　determinate。　We　may　say　the　same　of　the



objects　of　Smelling　and　Hearing；　and　of　all　sensibles　not　discerned　by



actual　contact。　Now；　there　is；　in　the　interval　of　distance；　some



extreme　place；　the　last　from　which　the　object　is　invisible；　and　the



first　from　which　it　is　visible。　This　place；　beyond　which　if　the　object



be　one　cannot　perceive　it；　while　if　the　object　be　on　the　hither　side



one　must　perceive　it；　is；　I　presume；　itself　necessarily　indivisible。



Therefore；　if　any　sensible　object　be　indivisible；　such　object；　if



set　in　the　said　extreme　place　whence　imperceptibility　ends　and



perceptibility　begins；　will　have　to　be　both　visible　and　invisible



their　objects；　whether　regarded　in　general　or　at　the　same　time；　but



this　is　impossible。



　　This　concludes　our　survey　of　the　characteristics　of　the　organs　of



Sense…perception　and　their　objects；　whether　regarded　in　general　or



in　relation　to　each　organ。　Of　the　remaining　subjects；　we　must　first



consider　that　of　memory　and　remembering。











　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　…THE　END…



。