shorter logic-第93部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


called：　a　perception　is　as　little　the　concreteness　of　reason　and　the　idea。　

Another　point　calls　for　notice。　Geometry　works　with　the　sensuous　but　abstract
perception　of　space；　and　in　space　it　experiences　no　difficulty　in　isolating　and
defining　certain　simple　analytical　modes。　

To　geometry　alone　therefore　belongs　in　its　perfection　the　synthetic　method　of
finite　cognition。　In　its　course；　however　（and　this　is　the　remarkable　point）；　it　finally
stumbles　upon　what　are　termed　irrational　and　incommensurable　quantities；　and　in
their　case　any　attempt　at　further　specification　drives　it　beyond　the　principle　of　the
understanding。　This　is　only　one　of　many　instances　in　terminology；　where　the　title
'rational'　is　perversely　applied　to　the　province　of　understanding；　while　we
stigmatise　as　irrational　that　which　shows　a　beginning　and　a　trace　of　rationality。
Other　sciences；　removed　as　they　are　from　the　simplicity　of　space　or　number；
often　and　necessarily　reach　a　point　where　understanding　permits　no　further
advance：　but　they　get　over　the　difficulty　without　trouble。　They　make　a　break　in
the　strict　sequence　of　their　procedure；　and　assume　whatever　they　require；　though
it　be　the　reverse　of　what　preceded；　from　some　external　quarter　…　opinion；
perception；　conception；　or　any　other　source。　Its　inobservancy　as　to　the　nature　of
its　methods　and　their　relativity　to　the　subject…matter　prevents　this　finite　cognition
from　seeing　that；　when　it　proceeds　by　definitions　and　divisions；　etc。；　it　is　really　led
on　by　the　necessity　of　the　laws　of　the　notion。　For　the　same　reason　it　cannot　see
when　it　has　reached　its　limit；　nor；　if　it　have　transgressed　that　limit；　does　it　perceive
that　it　is　in　a　sphere　where　the　categories　of　understanding；　which　it　still　continues
rudely　to　apply；　have　lost　all　authority。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§232

The　necessity　which　finite　cognition　produces　in　the　Demonstration　is；　in　the　first
place；　an　external　necessity；　intended　for　the　subjective　intelligence　alone。　But　in
necessity　as　such；　cognition　itself　has　left　behind　its　presupposition　and
starting…point；　which　consisted　in　accepting　its　content　as　given　or　found。
Necessity　qua　necessity　is　implicitly　the　self…relating　notion。　The　subjective　idea
has　thus　implicitly　reached　an　original　and　objective　determinateness　…　a
something　not…given；　and　for　that　reason　immanent　in　the　subject。　It　has　passed
over　into　the　idea　of　Will。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　232n

The　necessity　which　cognition　reaches　by　means　of　the　demonstration　is　the　reverse　of　what
formed　its　starting…point。　In　its　starting…point　cognition　had　a　given　and　a　contingent　content；　but
now；　at　the　close　of　its　movement；　it　knows　its　content　to　be　necessary。　This　necessity　is　reached
by　means　of　subjective　agency。　Similarly；　subjectivity　at　starting　was　quite　abstract；　a　bare　tabula
rasa。　It　now　shows　itself　as　a　modifying　and　determining　principle。　In　this　way　we　pass　from　the
idea　of　cognition　to　that　of　will。　The　passage；　as　will　be　apparent　on　a　closer　examination；　means
that　the　universal；　to　be　truly　apprehended；　must　be　apprehended　as　subjectivity；　as　a　notion
self…moving；　active；　and　form…imposing。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＇b＇　Volition
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§233

The　subjective　idea　as　original　and　objective　determinateness；　and　as　a　simple
uniform　content；　is　the　Good。　Its　impulse　towards　self…realisation　is　in　its
behaviour　the　reverse　of　the　idea　of　truth；　and　rather　directed　towards　moulding
the　world　it　finds　before　it　into　a　shape　conformable　to　its　purposed　End。　This
Volition　has；　on　the　one　hand；　the　certitude　of　the　nothingness　of　the
presupposed　object；　but；　on　the　other；　as　finite；　it　at　the　same　time　presupposes
the　purposed　End　of　the　Good　to　be　a　mere　subjective　idea；　and　the　object　to　be
independent。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　234

This　action　of　the　Will　is　finite：　and　its　finitude　lies　in　the　contradiction　that　in　the
inconsistent　terms　applied　to　the　objective　world　the　End　of　the　Good　is　just　as
much　not　executed　as　executed；　the　end　in　question　put　as　unessential　as　much　as
essential；　as　actual　and　at　the　same　time　as　merely　possible。　This　contradiction
presents　itself　to　imagination　as　an　endless　progress　in　the　actualising　of　the　Good；
which　is　therefore　set　up　and　fixed　as　a　mere　'ought'；　or　goal　of　perfection。　In
point　of　form　however　this　contradiction　vanishes　when　the　action　supersedes　the
subjectivity　of　the　purpose；　and　along　with　it　the　objectivity；　with　the　contrast
which　makes　both　finite；　abolishing　subjectivity　as　a　whole　and　not　merely　the
one…sidedness　of　this　form　of　it。　（For　another　new　subjectivity　of　the　kind；　that　is；
a　new　generation　of　the　contrast；　is　not　distinct　from　that　which　is　supposed　to　be
past　and　gone。）　This　return　into　itself　is　at　the　same　time　the　content's　own
'recollection'　that　it　is　the　Good　and　the　implicit　identity　of　the　two　sides　…　it　is　a
'recollection'　of　the　presupposition　of　the　theoretical　attitude　of　mind　（§　224）　that
the　objective　world　is　its　own　truth　and　substantiality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　234n

While　Intelligence　merely　proposes　to　take　the　world　as　it　is；　Will　takes　steps　to　make　the　world
what　it　ought　to　be。　Will　looks　upon　the　immediate　and　given　present　not　as　solid　being；　but　as
mere　semblance　without　reality。　It　is　here　that　we　meet　those　contradictions　which　are　so
bewildering　from　the　standpoint　of　abstract　morality。　This　position　in　its　'practical'　bearings　is　the
one　taken　by　the　philosophy　of　Kant；　and　even　by　that　of　Fichte。　The　Good；　say　these　writers；　has
to　be　realised：　we　have　to　work　in　order　to　produce　it：　and　Will　is　only　the　Good　actualising　itself。
If　the　world　then　were　as　it　ought　to　be；　the　action　of　Will　would　be　at　an　end。　The　Will　itself
therefore　requires　that　its　End　should　not　be　realised。　In　these　words；　a　correct　expression　is　given
to　the　finitude　of　Will。　But　finitude　was　not　meant　to　be　the　ultimate　point：　and　it　is　the　process　of
Will　itself　which　abolishes　finitude　and　the　contradiction　it　involves。　

The　reconciliation　is　achieved　when　Will　in　its　result　returns　to　the　presupposition　made　by
cognition。　In　other　words；　it　consists　in　the　unity　of　the　theoretical　and　practical　idea。　Will　knows
the　end　to　be　its　own；　and　Intelligence　apprehends　the　world　as　the　notion　actual。　This　is　the　right
attitude　of　rational　cognition。　Nullity　and　transitoriness　constitute　only　the　superficial　features　and
not　the　real　essence　of　the　world。　That　essence　is　the　notion　in　posse　and　in　esse：　and　thus　the
world　is　itself　the　idea。　All　unsatisfied　endeavour　ceases；　when　we　recognise　that　the　final　purpose
of　the　world　is　accomplished　no　less　than　ever　accomplishing　itself。　Generally　speaking；　this　is　the
man's　way　of　looking；　while　the　young　imagine　that　the　world　is　utterly　sunk　in　wickedness；　and
that　the　first　thing　needful　is　a　thorough　transformation。　The　religious　mind；　on　the　contrary；　views
the　world　as　ruled　by　Divine　Providence；　and　therefore　correspondent　with　what　it　ought　to　be。
But　this　harmony　between　the　'is'　and　the　'ought