shorter logic-第80部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


the　predicate　of　the　subject；　and　so　that　external　subjective　e　subsumption　is　again
put　in　abeyance；　and　the　Judgment　taken　as　a　determination　of　the　object　itself。
The　etymological　meaning　of　the　Judgment　（　Urtheil）　in　German　goes　deeper；　as
it　were　declaring　the　unity　of　the　notion　to　be　primary；　and　its　distinction　to　be　the
original　partition。　And　that　is　what　the　Judgment　really　is。　

In　its　abstract　terms　a　Judgment　is　expressible　in　the　proposition：　'The　individual　is
the　universal。'　These　are　the　terms　under　which　the　subject　and　the　predicate　first
confront　each　other；　when　the　functions　of　the　notion　are　taken　in　their　immediate
character　or　first　abstraction。　（Propositions　such　as；　'The　particular　is　the
universal'；　and　'The　individual　is　the　particular'；　belong　to　the　further
specialisation　of　the　judgment。）　It　shows　a　strange　want　of　observation　in　the
logic…books；　that　in　none　of　them　is　the　fact　stated；　that　in　every　judgment　there　is
still　a　statement　made；　as；　the　individual　is　the　universal；　or　still　more　definitely；
The　subject　is　the　predicate　（e。g。　God　is　absolute　spirit）。　No　doubt　there　is　also　a
distinction　between　terms　like　individual　and　universal；　subject　and　predicate：　but
it　is　none　the　less　the　universal　fact；　that　every　judgment　states　them　to　be
identical。　

The　copula　'is'　springs　from　the　nature　of　the　notion；　to　be　self…identical　even　in
parting　with　its　own。　The　individual　and　universal　are　its　constituents；　and
therefore　characters　which　cannot　be　isolated。　The　earlier　categories　（of
reflection）　in　their　correlations　also　refer　to　one　another：　but　their　interconnection
is　only　'having'　anal　not　'being'；　i。e。　it　is　not　the　identity　which　is　realised　as
identity　or　universality。　In　the　judgment；　therefore；　for　the　first　time　there　is　seen
the　genuine　particularity　of　the　notion：　for　it　is　the　speciality　or　distinguishing　of
the　latter；　without　thereby　losing　universality。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　166n

Judgments　are　generally　looked　upon　as　combinations　of　notions；　and；　be　it　added；　of
heterogeneous　notions。　This　theory　of　judgment　is　correct；　so　far　as　it　implies　that　it　is　the　notion
which　forms　the　presupposition　of　the　judgment；　and　which　in　the　judgment　comes　up　under　the
form　of　difference。　But　on　the　other　hand；　it　is　false　to　speak　of　notions　differing　in　kind。　The
notion；　although　concrete；　is　still　as　a　notion　essentially　one；　and　the　functions　which　it　contains　are
not　different　kinds　of　it。　It　is　equally　false　to　speak　of　a　combination　of　the　two　sides　in　the
judgment；　if　we　understand　the　term　'combination'　to　imply　the　independent　existence　of　the
combining　members　apart　from　the　combination。　The　same　external　view　of　their　nature　is　more
forcibly　apparent　when　judge　moments　are　described　as　produced　by　the　ascription　of　a　predicate
to　the　subject。　

Language　like　this　looks　upon　the　subject　as　self…subsistent　outside；　and　the　predicate　as　found
somewhere　in　our　head。　Such　a　conception　of　the　relation　between　subject　and　predicate　however
is　at　once　contradicted　by　the　copula　'is'。　By　saying　'This　rose　is　red'；　or　'This　picture　is　beautiful'；
we　declare；　that　it　is　not　we　who　from　outside　attach　beauty　to　the　picture　or　redness　to　the　rose；
but　that　these　are　the　characteristics　proper　to　these　objects。　An　additional　fault　in　the　way　in
which　Formal　Logic　conceives　the　judgment　is；　that　it　makes　the　judgment　look　as　if　it　were
something　merely　contingent；　and　does　not　offer　any　proof　for　the　advance　from　notion　on　to
judgment。　For　the　notion　does　not；　as　understanding　supposes；　stand　still　in　its　own　immobility。　It
is　rather　an　infinite　form；　of　boundless　activity；　as　it　were　the　punctum　sapiens　of　all　vitality；　and
thereby　self…differentiating。　

This　disruption　of　the　notion　into　the　difference　of　its　constituent　functions　…　a　disruption　imposed
by　the　native　act　of　the　notion　…　is　the　judgment。　A　judgment　therefore　means　the　particularising　of
the　notion。　No　doubt　the　notion　is　implicitly　the　particular。　But　in　the　notion　as　notion　the　particular
is　not　yet　explicit；　and　still　remains　in　transparent　unity　with　the　universal。　

Thus；　for　example；　as　we　remarked　before　（§　160n）；　the　germ　of　a　plant　contains　its　particular；
such　as　root；　branches；　leaves；　etc。：　but　these　details　are　at　first　present　only　potentially；　and　are
not　realised　till　the　germ　uncloses。　This　unclosing　is；　as　it　were；　the　judgment　of　the　plant。　The
illustration　may　also　serve　to　show　how　neither　the　notion　nor　the　judgment　are　merely　found　in　our
head；　or　merely　framed　by　us。　The　notion　is　the　very　heart　of　things；　and　makes　them　what　they
are。　To　form　a　notion　of　an　object　means　therefore　to　become　aware　of　its　notion：　and　when　we
proceed　to　a　criticism　or　judgment　of　the　object；　we　are　not　performing　a　subjective　act；　and
merely　ascribing　this　or　that　predicate　to　the　object。　We　are；　on　the　contrary；　observing　the　object
in　the　specific　character　imposed　by　its　notion。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　167

The　Judgment　is　usually　taken　in　a　subjective　sense　as　an　operation　and　a　form；
occurring　merely　in　self…conscious　thought。　This　distinction；　however；　has　no
existence　on　purely　by　which　the　judgment　is　taken　in　the　quite　universal
signification　that　all　things　are　a　judgment。　That　is　to　say；　they　are　individuals
which　are　a　universality　or　inner　nature　in　themselves　…　a　universal　which　is
individualised。　Their　universality　and　individuality　are　distinguished；　but　the　one　is
at　the　same　time　identical　with　the　other。　

The　interpretation　of　the　judgment；　according　to　which　it　is　assumed　to　be　merely
subjective；　as　if　we　ascribed　a　predicate　to　a　subject　is　contradicted　by　the
decidedly　objective　expression　of　the　judgment。　The　rose　is　red；　Gold　is　a　metal。
It　is　not　by　us　that　something　is　first　ascribed　to　them。　A　judgment　is　however
distinguished　from　a　proposition。　The　latter　contains　a　statement　about　the
subject；　which　does　not　stand　to　it　in　any　universal　relationship；　but　expresses
some　single　action；　or　some　state；　or　the　like。　Thus；　'Caesar　was　born　at　Rome　in
such　and　such　a　year　waged　war　in　Gaul　for　ten　years；　crossed　the　Rubicon；　etc。'；
are　propositions；　but　not　judgments。　Again　it　is　absurd　to　say　that　such　statements
as　'I　slept　well　last　night'　or　'Present　arms！'　maybe　turned　into　the　form　of　a
judgment。　'A　carriage　is　passing　by'　should　be　a　judgment；　and　a　subjective　one　at
best；　only　if　it　were　doubtful；　whether　the　passing　object　was　a　carriage；　or
whether　it　and　not　rather　the　point　of　observation　was　in　motion：　in　short；　only　if
it　were　desired　to　specify　a　conception　which　was　still　short　of　appropriate
specification。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　168

The　judgment　is　an　expression　of　finitude。　Things　from　its　point　of　view　are　said
to　be　finite；　because　they　are　a　judgment；　because　their　definite　being　and　their
universal　nature　（their　body　and　their　soul）；　though　united　indeed　（otherwise　the
things　would　be　nothing）；　are　still　elements　in　the　constitution　which　are　already
different　and　also　in　any　case　separable。