shorter logic-第57部分

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and　its　proposer　may　be　met　with　the　question　what　he　means　by　Identity；　whereupon　we　should
soon　see　that　he　attaches　no　idea　to　it　at　all；　and　that　Identity　is　for　him　an　empty　name。　As　we
have　seen；　besides；　Identity　is　undoubtedly　a　negative　…　not　however　an　abstract　empty　Nought；
but　the　negation　of　Being　and　its　characteristics。　Being　so；　Identity　is　at　the　same　time　self…relation；
and；　what　is　more；　negative　self…relation；　in　other　words；　it　draws　a　distinction　between　it　and
itself。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Diversity
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　117
Difference　is　first　of　all　（1）　immediate　difference；　i。e。　Diversity　or　Variety。　In
Diversity　the　different　things　are　each　individually　what　they　are；　and　unaffected
by　the　relation　in　which　they　stand　to　each　other。　This　relation　is　therefore
external　to　them。　In　consequence　of　the　various　things　being　thus　indifferent　to
the　difference　between　them；　it　falls　outside　them　into　a　third　thing；　the　agent　of
Comparison。　This　external　difference；　as　an　identity　of　the　objects　related；　is
Likeness；　as　a　non…identity　of　them；　is　Unlikeness。　

The　gap　which　understanding　allows　to　divide　these　characteristics　is　so　great　that
although　comparison　has　one　and　the　same　substratum　for　likeness　and
unlikeness；　which　are　explained　to　be　different　aspects　and　points　of　view　in　it；
still　likeness　by　itself　is　the　first　of　the　elements　alone；　viz。；　identity；　and
unlikeness　by　itself　is　difference。　

Diversity　has；　like　Identity；　been　transformed　into　a　maxim：　'Everything　is　various
or　different'：　or　'There　are　no　two　things　completely　like　each　other'。　Here
Everything　is　put　under　a　predicate；　which　is　the　reverse　of　the　identity　attributed
to　it　in　the　first　maxim：　and　therefore　under　a　law　contradicting　the　first。
However；　there　is　an　explanation。　As　the　diversity　is　supposed　due　only　to
external　circumstances；　anything　taken　per　se　is　expected　and　understood　always
to　be　identical　with　itself；　so　that　the　second　law　need　not　interfere　with　the　first。
But；　in　that　case；　variety　does　not　belong　to　the　something　or　everything　in
question：　it　constitutes　no　intrinsic　characteristic　of　the　subject：　and　the　second
maxim　on　this　showing　does　not　admit　of　being　stated　at　all。　If；　on　the　other　hand；
the　something　itself　is；　as　the　maxim　says；　diverse；　it　must　be　in　virtue　of　its　own
proper　character：　but　in　this　case　the　specific　difference；　and　not　variety　as　such；
is　what　is　intended。　And　this　is　the　meaning　of　the　maxim　of　Leibnitz。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　117n
When　understanding　sets　itself　to　study　Identity；　it　has　already　passed　beyond　it；　and　is　looking　at
Difference　in　the　shape　of　bare　Variety。　If　we　follow　the　so…called　law　of　Identity；　and　say；　The
sea　is　the　sea；　The　air　is　the　air；　The　moon　is　the　moon；　these　objects　pass　for　having　no　bearing
on　one　another。　What　we　have　before　us　therefore　is　not　Identity；　but　Difference。　We　do　not　stop
at　this　point；　however；　or　regard　things　merely　as　different。　We　compare　them　one　with　another；
and　then　discover　the　features　of　likeness　and　unlikeness。　The　work　of　the　finite　sciences　lies　to　a
great　extent　in　the　application　of　these　categories；　and　the　phrase　'scientific　treatment'　generally
means　no　more　than　the　method　which　has　for　its　aim　comparison　of　the　objects　under
examination。　This　method　has　undoubtedly　led　to　some　important　results；　we　may　particularly
mention　the　great　advance　of　modern　times　in　the　provinces　of　comparative　anatomy　and
comparative　linguistics。　But　it　is　going　too　far　to　suppose　that　the　comparative　method　can　be
employed　with　equal　success　in　all　branches　of　knowledge。　Not　…　and　this　must　be　emphasised　…
can　mere　comparison　ever　ultimately　satisfy　the　requirements　of　science。　Its　results　are　indeed
indispensable；　but　they　are　still　labours　only　preliminary　to　truly　intelligent　cognition。　

If　it　be　the　office　of　comparison　to　reduce　existing　differences　to　Identity；　the　science　which　most
perfectly　fulfils　that　end　is　mathematics。　The　reason　of　that　is　that　quantitative　difference　is　only　the
difference　which　is　quite　external。　Thus；　in　geometry；　a　triangle　and　a　quadrangle；　figures
qualitatively　different；　have　this　qualitative　difference　discounted　by　abstraction；　and　are　equalised
to　one　another　in　magnitude。　It　follows　from　what　has　been　said　formerly　about　mere　Identity　of
understanding　that；　as　has　also　been　pointed　out　（s。　99）；　neither　philosophy　nor　the　empirical
sciences　need　envy　this　superiority　of　Mathematics。　

The　story　is　told　that　when　Leibnitz　propounded　the　maxim　of　Variety；　the　cavaliers　and　ladies　of
the　court；　as　they　walked　round　the　garden；　made　efforts　to　discover　two　leaves　indistinguishable
from　each　other；　in　order　to　confute　the　law　stated　by　the　philosopher。　Their　device　was
unquestionably　a　convenient　method　of　dealing　with　metaphysics　…　one　which　has　not　ceased　to　be
fashionable。　All　the　same；　as　regards　the　principle　of　Leibnitz；　difference　must　be　understood　to
mean　not　an　external　and　indifferent　diversity　merely；　but　difference　essential。　Hence　the　very
nature　of　things　implies　that　they　must　be　different。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Likeness　and　Unlikeness
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　118
Likeness　is　an　identity　only　of　those　things　which　are　not　the　same；　not　identical
with　each　other：　and　Unlikeness　is　a　relation　of　things　alike。　The　two　therefore　do
not　fall　on　different　aspects　or　points　of　view　in　the　thing；　without　any　mutual
affinity；　but　one　throws　light　into　the　other。　Variety　thus　comes　to　be　reflexive
difference　or　difference　（distinction）　implicit　and　essential；　determinate　or
specific　difference。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Difference　and　identity　in　natural　science
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　118n
While　things　merely　various　show　themselves　unaffected　by　each　other；　likeness　and　unlikeness　on
the　contrary　are　a　pair　of　characteristics　which　are　in　completely　reciprocal　relation。　This　advance
from　simple　variety　to　opposition　appears　in　our　common　acts　of　thought　when　we　allow　that
comparison　has　a　meaning　only　upon　the　hypothesis　of　an　existing　difference；　and　that　on　the　other
hand　we　can　distinguish　only　on　the　hypothesis　of　existing　similarity。　Hence；　if　the　problem　be　the
discovery　of　a　difference；　we　attribute　no　great　cleverness　to　the　man　who　only　distinguishes　those
objects；　of　which　the　difference　is　palpable；　e。g。　a　pen　and　a　camel：　and　similarly　it　implies　no　very
advanced　faculty　of　comparison　when　the　objects　compared；　e。g。　a　beech　and　an　oak；　a　temple
and　a　church；　are　near　akin。　In　the　case　of　difference；　in　short；　we　like　to　see　identity；　and　in　the
case　of　identity；　we　like　to　see　difference。　Within　the　range　of　empirical　sciences；　however；　the　one
of　these　two　categories　is　often　allowed　to　put　the　other　out　of　sight　and　mind。　

Thus　the　scientific　problem　at　one　time　is　to　reduce　existing　differences　to　identity；　on　another
occasion；　with　equal　one…sidedness；　to　discover　new　differences。　We　see　this　especially　in
physical　science。　There　the　problem　consists；　in　the　first　place；　in　the　continual　search　for　new