shorter logic-第26部分

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succeeding　each　other　and　of　objects　in　juxtaposition；　but　it　presents　no　necessary
connection。　If　perception；　therefore；　is　to　maintain　its　claim　to　be　the　sole　basis　of
what　men　hold　for　truth；　universality　and　necessity　appear　something　illegitimate：
they　become　an　accident　of　our　minds；　a　mere　custom；　the　content　of　which
might　be　otherwise　constituted　than　it　is。　

It　is　an　important　corollary　of　this　theory；　that　on　this　empirical　mode　of　treatment
legal　and　ethical　principles　and　laws；　as　well　as　the　truths　of　religion；　are　exhibited
as　the　work　of　chance；　and　stripped　of　their　objective　character　and　inner　truth。　

The　scepticism　of　Hume；　to　which　this　conclusion　was　chiefly　due；　should　be
clearly　marked　off　from　Greek　scepticism。　Hume　assumes　the　truth　of　the
empirical　element；　feeling　and　sensation；　and　proceeds　to　challenge　universal
principles　and　laws；　because　they　have　no　warranty　from　sense…perception。　So　far
was　ancient　scepticism　from　making　feeling　and　sensation　the　canon　of　truth；　that
it　turned　against　the　deliverances　of　sense　first　of　all。　（On　modern　scepticism　as
compared　with　ancient；　see　Schelling　and　Hegel's　Critical　Journal　of　Philosophy）




III。　Second　Attitude　of　Thought　to　Objectivity
　　　　　　　　　　　　TWO。　THE　CRITICAL　PHILOSOPHY


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§40

In　common　with　Empiricism　the　Critical　Philosophy　assumes　that　experience
affords　the　one　sole　foundation　for　cognitions；　which　however　it　does　not　allow　to
rank　as　truths；　but　only　as　knowledge　of　phenomena。　

The　Critical　theory　starts　originally　from　the　distinction　of　elements　presented　in
the　analysis　of　experience；　viz。　the　matter　of　sense；　and　its　universal　relations。
Taking　into　account　Hume's　criticism　on　this　distinction　as　given　in　the　preceding
section；　viz。　that　sensation　does　not　explicitly　apprehend　more　than　an　individual
or　more　than　a　mere　event；　it　insists　at　the　same　time　on　the　fact　that　universality
and　necessity　are　seen　to　perform　a　function　equally　essential　in　constituting　what
is　called　experience。　This　element；　not　being　derived　from　the　empirical　facts　as
such；　must　belong　to　the　spontaneity　of　thought；　in　other　words；　it　is　a　priori。
The　Categories　or　Notions　of　the　Understanding　constitute　the　objectivity　of
experiential　cognitions。　In　every　case　they　involve　a　connective　reference；　and
hence　through　their　means　are　formed　synthetic　judgements　a　priori；　that　is；
primary　and　underivative　connections　of　opposites。　

Even　Hume's　scepticism　does　not　deny　that　the　characteristics　of　universality　and
necessity　are　found　in　cognition。　And　even　in　Kant　this　fact　remains　a
presupposition　after　all；　it　may　be　said；　to　use　the　ordinary　phraseology　of　the
sciences；　that　Kant　did　no　more　than　offer　another　explanation　of　the　fact。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　41

The　Critical　Philosophy　proceeds　to　test　the　value　of　the　categories　employed　in
metaphysic；　as　well　as　in　other　sciences　and　in　ordinary　conception。　This　scrutiny
however　is　not　directed　to　the　content　of　these　categories；　nor　does　it　inquire　into
the　exact　relation　they　bear　to　one　another：　but　simply　considers　them　as　affected
by　the　contrast　between　subjective　and　objective。　The　contrast；　as　we　are　to
understand　it　here；　bears　upon　the　distinction　（see　preceding　§）　of　the　two
elements　in　experience。　The　name　of　objectivity　is　here　given　to　the　element　of
universality　and　necessity；　i。e。　to　the　categories　themselves；　or　what　is　called　the　a
priori　constituent。　The　Critical　Philosophy　however　widened　the　contrast　in　such
a　way；　that　the　subjectivity　comes　to　embrace　the　ensemble　of　experience；
including　both　of　the　aforesaid　elements；　and　nothing　remains　on　the　other　side
but　the　'thing…in…itself'。　

The　special　forms　of　the　a　priori　element；　in　other　words；　of　thought；　which　in
spite　of　its　objectivity　is　looked　upon　as　a　purely　subjective　act；　present
themselves　as　follows　in　a　systematic　order　which；　it　may　be　remarked；　is　solely
based　upon　psychological　and　historical　grounds。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§41n

（1）　A　very　important　step　was　undoubtedly　made；　when　the　terms　of　the　old
metaphysic　were　subjected　to　scrutiny。　The　plain　thinker　pursued　his
unsuspecting　way　in　those　categories　which　had　offered　themselves　naturally。　It
never　occurred　to　him　to　ask　to　what　extent　these　categories　had　a　value　and
authority　of　their　own。　If；　as　has　been　said；　it　is　characteristic　of　free　thought　to
allow　no　assumptions　to　pass　unquestioned；　the　old　metaphysicians　were　not　free
thinkers。　They　accepted　their　categories　as　they　were；　without　further　trouble；　as
an　a　priori　datum；　not　yet　tested　by　reflection。　The　Critical　philosophy　reversed
this。　Kant　undertook　to　examine　how　far　the　forms　of　thought　were　capable　of
leading　to　the　knowledge　of　truth。　In　particular　he　demanded　a　criticism　of　the
faculty　of　cognition　as　preliminary　to　its　exercise。　That　is　a　fair　demand；　if　it　mean
that　even　the　forms　of　thought　must　be　made　an　object　of　investigation。
Unfortunately　there　soon　creeps　in　the　misconception　of　already　knowing　before
you　know　…　the　error　of　refusing　to　enter　the　water　until　you　have　learnt　to　swim。
True；　indeed；　the　forms　of　thought　should　be　subjected　to　a　scrutiny　before　they
are　used：　yet　what　is　this　scrutiny　but　ipso　facto　a　cognition？　

So　that　what　we　want　is　to　combine　in　our　process　of　inquiry　the　action　of　the
forms　of　thought　with　a　criticism　of　them。　The　forms　of　thought　must　be　studied
in　their　essential　nature　and　complete　development：　they　are　at　once　the　object　of
research　and　the　action　of　that　object。　Hence　they　examine　themselves：　in　their
own　action　they　must　determine　their　limits；　and　point　out　their　defects。　This　is
that　action　of　thought；　which　will　hereafter　be　specially　considered　under　the
name　of　Dialectic；　and　regarding　which　we　need　only　at　the　outset　observe　that；
instead　of　being　brought　to　bear　upon　the　categories　from　without；　it　is　Immanent
in　their　own　action。　

We　may　therefore　state　the　first　point　in　Kant's　philosophy　as　follows：　Thought
must　itself　investigate　its　own　capacity　of　knowledge。　People　in　the　present　day
have　got　over　Kant　and　his　philosophy：　everybody　wants　to　get　further。　But　there
are　two　ways　of　going　further　…　a　backward　and　a　forward。　The　light　of　criticism
soon　shows　that　many　of　our　modern　essays　in　philosophy　are　mere　repetitions　of
the　old　metaphysical　method；　an　endless　and　uncritical　thinking　in　a　groove
determined　by　the　natural　bent　of　each　man's　mind。　

（2）　Kant's　examination　of　the　categories　suffers　from　the　grave　defect　of　viewing
them；　not　absolutely　and　for　their　own　sake；　but　in　order　to　see　whether　they　are
subjective　or　objective。　In　the　language　of　common　life　we　mean　by　objective
what　exists　outside　of　us　and　reaches　us　from　without　by　means　of　sensation。
What　Kant　did　was　to　deny　that　the　categories；　such　as　cause　and　effect；　were；　in
this　sense　of　the　word；　objective；　or　given　in　sensation；　and　to　maintain　on　the
contrary　that　they　belonged　to　our　own　thought　itself；　to　the　spontaneity　of
thought。　To　that　extent　therefore　they　were　subjectiv