shorter logic-第22部分

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circumstances　direct；　and　the　import　ascribed　to　them　is　founded　only　upon
common　sensualised　conceptions；　upon　assertions　that　particular　words　are　used
in　a　particular　sense；　and　even　perhaps　upon　etymology。　If　experience　pronounces
the　list　to　be　complete；　and　if　the　usage　of　language；　by　its　agreement；　shows　the
analysis　to　be　correct；　the　metaphysician　is　satisfied；　and　the　intrinsic　and
independent　truth　and　necessity　of　such　characteristics　is　never　made　a　matter　of
：investigation　at　all。　

To　ask　if　being；　existence；　finitude；　simplicity；　complexity；　etc。　are　notions
intrinsically　and　independently　true；　must　surprise　those　who　believe　that　a
question　about　truth　can　only　concern　propositions　（as　to　whether　a　notion　is　or　is
not　with　truth　to　be　attributed；　as　the　phrase　is；　to　a　subject）；　and　that　falsehood
lies　in　the　contradiction　existing　between　the　subject　in　our　ideas；　and　the　notion
to　be　predicated　of　it。　Now　as　the　notion　is　concrete；　it　and　every　character　of　it
in　general　is　essentially　a　self…contained　unity　of　distinct　characteristics。　If　truth
then　were　nothing　more　than　the　absence　of　contradiction；　it　would　be　first　of　all
necessary　in　the　case　of　every　notion　to　examine　whether　it；　taken　individually；
did　not　contain　this　sort　of　intrinsic　contradiction。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§34

The　second　branch　of　the　metaphysical　system　was　Rational　Psychology　or
Pneumatology。　It　dealt　with　the　metaphysical　nature　of　the　soul　…　that　is；　of　the
Mind　regarded　as　a　thing。　It　expected　to　find　immortality　in　a　sphere　dominated
by　the　laws　of　composition；　time；　qualitative　change；　and　quantitative　increase　or
decrease。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§34n

The　name　'rational'；　given　to　this　species　of　psychology；　served　to　contrast　it　with　empirical　modes
of　observing　the　phenomena　of　the　soul　Rational　psychology　viewed　the　soul　in　its　metaphysical
nature；　and　through　the　categories　supplied　by　abstract　thought。　The　rationalists　endeavoured　to
ascertain　the　inner　nature　of　the　soul　as　it　is　in　itself　and　as　it　is　for　thought。　In　philosophy　at　present
we　hear　little　of　the　soul：　the　favourite　term　is　now　mind　（spirit）。　The　two　are　distinct；　soul　being　as
it　were　the　middle　term　between　body　and　spirit；　or　the　bond　between　the　two。　The　mind；　as　soul；
is　immersed　in　corporeity；　and　the　soul　is　the　animating　principle　of　the　body。　

The　pre…Kantian　metaphysic；　we　say；　viewed　the　soul　as　a　thing。　'Thing'　is　a　very　ambiguous
word。　By　a　thing；　we　mean；　firstly；　an　immediate　existence；　something　we　represent　in　sensuous
form：　and　in　this　meaning　the　term　has　been　applied　to　the　soul。　Hence　the　question　regarding　the
seat　of　the　soul。　Of　course；　if　the　soul　have　a　seat；　it　is　in　space　and　sensuously　envisaged。　So；　too；
if　the　soul　be　viewed　as　a　thing　we　can　ask　whether　the　soul　is　simple　or　composite。　The　question
is　important　as　bearing　on　the　immortality　of　the　soul；　which　is　supposed　to　depend　on　the　absence
of　composition。　But　the　fact　is；　that　in　abstract　simplicity　we　have　a　category；　which　as　little
corresponds　to　the　nature　of　the　soul；　as　that　of　compositeness。　

One　word　on　the　relation　of　rational　to　empirical　psychology。　The　former；　because　it　sets　itself　to
apply　thought　to　cognise　mind　and　even　to　demonstrate　the　result　of　such　thinking；　is　the　higher；
whereas　empirical　psychology　starts　from　perception；　and　only　recounts　and　describes　what
perception　supplies。　But　if　we　propose　to　think　the　mind；　we　must　not　be　quite　so　shy　of　its　special
phenomena。　Mind　is　essentially　active　in　the　same　sense　as　the　Schoolmen　＇Scholastics＇　said　that
God　is　'absolute　actuosity'。　But　if　the　mind　is　active　it　must　as　it　were　utter　itself。　It　is　wrong
therefore　to　take　the　mind　for　a　processless　ens；　as　did　the　old　metaphysic　which　divided　the
processless　inward　life　of　the　mind　from　its　outward　life。　The　mind；　of　all　things；　must　be　looked　at
in　its　concrete　actuality；　in　its　energy；　and　in　such　a　way　that　its　manifestations　are　seen　to　be
determined　by　its　inward　force。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§35

The　third　branch　of　metaphysics　was　Cosmology。　The　topics　it　embraced　were
the　world；　its　contingency；　necessity；　eternity；　limitation　in　time　and　space：　the
laws　（only　formal）　of　its　changes：　the　freedom　of　man　and　the　origin　of　evil。　

To　these　topics　it　applied　what　were　believed　to　be　thoroughgoing　contrasts：　such
as　contingency　and　necessity；　eternal　and　internal　necessity；　efficient　and　final
cause；　or　causality　in　general　and　design；　essence　or　substance　and　phenomenon；
form　and　matter；　freedom　and　necessity；　happiness　and　pain；　good　and　evil。　

The　object　of　Cosmology　comprised　not　merely　Nature；　but　Mind　too；　in　its　external　complicating
in　its　phenomenon…in　fact；　existence　in　general；　or　the　sum　of　finite　things。　This　object　however　it
viewed　not　as　a　concrete　whole；　but　only　under　certain　abstract　points　of　view。　Thus　the　questions
Cosmology　attempted　to　solve　were　such　as　these：　Is　accident　or　necessity　dominant　in　the　world？
Is　the　world　eternal　or　created？　It　was　therefore　a　chief　concern　of　this　study　to　lay　down　what
were　called　general　cosmological　laws：　for　instance；　that　Nature　does　not　act　by　fits　an　starts。　And
by　fits　and　starts　（saltus）　they　meant　a　qualitative　difference　or　qualitative　alteration　showing　itself
without　any　antecedent　determining　mean：　whereas；　on　the　contrary；　a　gradual　change　（of　quantity）
is　obviously　not　without　intermediation。　

In　regard　to　Mind　as　it　makes　itself　felt　in　the　world；　the　questions　which　Cosmology　chiefly
discussed　turned　upon　the　freedom　of　man　and　the　origin　of　evil。　Nobody　can　deny　that　these　are
questions　of　the　highest　importance。　But　to　give　them　a　satisfactory　answer；　it　is　above　all　things
necessary　not　to　claim　finality　for　the　abstract　formulae　of　understanding；　or　to　suppose　that　each
of　the　two　terms　in　an　antithesis　has　an　independent　subsistence　or　can　be　treated　in　its　isolation　as
a　complete　and　self…centred　truth。　This　however　is　the　general　position　taken　by　the
metaphysicians　before　Kant；　and　appears　in　their　cosmological　discussions；　which　for　that　reason
were　incapable　of　compassing　their　purpose；　to　understand　the　phenomena　of　the　world。　Observe
how　they　proceed　with　the　distinction　between　freedom　and　necessity；　in　their　application　of　these
categories　to　Nature　and　Mind。　Nature　they　regard　as　subject　in　its　workings　to　necessity；　Mind
they　hold　to　be　free。　No　doubt　there　is　a　real　foundation　for　this　distinction　in　the　very　core　of　the
Mind　itself：　but　freedom　and　necessity；　when　thus　abstractly　opposed；　are　terms　applicable　only　in
the　finite　world　to　which；　as　such；　they　belong。　A　freedom　involving　no　necessity；　and　mere
necessity　without　freedom；　are　abstract　and　in　this　way　untrue　formulae　of　thought。　Freedom　is　no
blank　indeterminateness：　essentially　concrete；　and　unvaryingly　self…determinate；　it　is　so　far　at　the
same　time　necessary。　Necessity；　again；　in　the　ordinary　acceptation　of　the　term　in　popular
philosophy；　means　determination　from　without　only　…　as　in　finite　mechanics；　where　a　body　moves
only　when　it　is　st