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on sophistical refutations-第9部分

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definite subject before them。 Also the putting of several questions;



even though the position against which one is arguing be quite



definite; and the claim that he shall say only what he thinks;



create abundant opportunity for drawing him into paradox or fallacy;



and also; whether to any of these questions he replies 'Yes' or



replies 'No'; of leading him on to statements against which one is



well off for a line of attack。 Nowadays; however; men are less able to



play foul by these means than they were formerly: for people rejoin



with the question; 'What has that to do with the original subject?' It



is; too; an elementary rule for eliciting some fallacy or paradox that



one should never put a controversial question straight away; but say



that one puts it from the wish for information: for the process of



inquiry thus invited gives room for an attack。



  A rule specially appropriate for showing up a fallacy is the



sophistic rule; that one should draw the answerer on to the kind of



statements against which one is well supplied with arguments: this can



be done both properly and improperly; as was said before。' Again; to



draw a paradoxical statement; look and see to what school of



philosophers the person arguing with you belongs; and then question



him as to some point wherein their doctrine is paradoxical to most



people: for with every school there is some point of that kind。 It



is an elementary rule in these matters to have a collection of the



special 'theses' of the various schools among your propositions。 The



solution recommended as appropriate here; too; is to point out that



the paradox does not come about because of the argument: whereas



this is what his opponent always really wants。



  Moreover; argue from men's wishes and their professed opinions。



For people do not wish the same things as they say they wish: they say



what will look best; whereas they wish what appears to be to their



interest: e。g。 they say that a man ought to die nobly rather than to



live in pleasure; and to live in honest poverty rather than in



dishonourable riches; but they wish the opposite。 Accordingly; a man



who speaks according to his wishes must be led into stating the



professed opinions of people; while he who speaks according to these



must be led into admitting those that people keep hidden away: for



in either case they are bound to introduce a paradox; for they will



speak contrary either to men's professed or to their hidden opinions。



  The widest range of common…place argument for leading men into



paradoxical statement is that which depends on the standards of Nature



and of the Law: it is so that both Callicles is drawn as arguing in



the Gorgias; and that all the men of old supposed the result to come



about: for nature (they said) and law are opposites; and justice is



a fine thing by a legal standard; but not by that of nature。



Accordingly; they said; the man whose statement agrees with the



standard of nature you should meet by the standard of the law; but the



man who agrees with the law by leading him to the facts of nature: for



in both ways paradoxical statements may be committed。 In their view



the standard of nature was the truth; while that of the law was the



opinion held by the majority。 So that it is clear that they; too; used



to try either to refute the answerer or to make him make paradoxical



statements; just as the men of to…day do as well。



  Some questions are such that in both forms the answer is



paradoxical; e。g。 'Ought one to obey the wise or one's father?' and



'Ought one to do what is expedient or what is just?' and 'Is it



preferable to suffer injustice or to do an injury?' You should lead



people; then; into views opposite to the majority and to the



philosophers; if any one speaks as do the expert reasoners; lead him



into opposition to the majority; while if he speaks as do the



majority; then into opposition to the reasoners。 For some say that



of necessity the happy man is just; whereas it is paradoxical to the



many that a king should be happy。 To lead a man into paradoxes of this



sort is the same as to lead him into the opposition of the standards



of nature and law: for the law represents the opinion of the majority;



whereas philosophers speak according to the standard of nature and the



truth。







                                13







  Paradoxes; then; you should seek to elicit by means of these



common…place rules。 Now as for making any one babble; we have



already said what we mean by 'to babble'。 This is the object in view



in all arguments of the following kind: If it is all the same to state



a term and to state its definition; the 'double' and 'double of



half' are the same: if then 'double' be the 'double of half'; it



will be the 'double of half of half'。 And if; instead of 'double';



'double of half' be again put; then the same expression will be



repeated three times; 'double of half of half of half'。 Also 'desire



is of the pleasant; isn't it?' desire is conation for the pleasant:



accordingly; 'desire' is 'conation for the pleasant for the pleasant'。



  All arguments of this kind occur in dealing (1) with any relative



terms which not only have relative genera; but are also themselves



relative; and are rendered in relation to one and the same thing; as



e。g。 conation is conation for something; and desire is desire of



something; and double is double of something; i。e。 double of half:



also in dealing (2) with any terms which; though they be not



relative terms at all; yet have their substance; viz。 the things of



which they are the states or affections or what not; indicated as well



in their definition; they being predicated of these things。 Thus



e。g。 'odd' is a 'number containing a middle': but there is an 'odd



number': therefore there is a 'number…containing…a…middle number'。



Also; if snubness be a concavity of the nose; and there be a snub



nose; there is therefore a 'concave…nose nose'。



  People sometimes appear to produce this result; without really



producing it; because they do not add the question whether the



expression 'double'; just by itself; has any meaning or no; and if so;



whether it has the same meaning; or a different one; but they draw



their conclusion straight away。 Still it seems; inasmuch as the word



is the same; to have the same meaning as well。







                                14







  We have said before what kind of thing 'solecism' is。' It is



possible both to commit it; and to seem to do so without doing so; and



to do so without seeming to do so。 Suppose; as Protagoras used to



say that menis ('wrath') and pelex ('helmet') are masculine:



according to him a man who calls wrath a 'destructress' (oulomenen)



commits a solecism; though he does not seem to do so to other



people; where he who calls it a 'destru
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