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on sophistical refutations-第8部分

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is deceptive and plays foul。 For just as a foul in a race is a



definite type of fault; and is a kind of foul fighting; so the art



of contentious reasoning is foul fighting in disputation: for in the



former case those who are resolved to win at all costs snatch at



everything; and so in the latter case do contentious reasoners。 Those;



then; who do this in order to win the mere victory are generally



considered to be contentious and quarrelsome persons; while those



who do it to win a reputation with a view to making money are



sophistical。 For the art of sophistry is; as we said;' a kind of art



of money…making from a merely apparent wisdom; and this is why they



aim at a merely apparent demonstration: and quarrelsome persons and



sophists both employ the same arguments; but not with the same



motives: and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious;



but not in the same respect; rather; it will be contentious in so



far as its aim is an apparent victory; while in so far as its aim is



an apparent wisdom; it will be sophistical: for the art of sophistry



is a certain appearance of wisdom without the reality。 The contentious



argument stands in somewhat the same relation to the dialectical as



the drawer of false diagrams to the geometrician; for it beguiles by



misreasoning from the same principles as dialectic uses; just as the



drawer of a false diagram beguiles the geometrician。 But whereas the



latter is not a contentious reasoner; because he bases his false



diagram on the principles and conclusions that fall under the art of



geometry; the argument which is subordinate to the principles of



dialectic will yet clearly be contentious as regards other subjects。



Thus; e。g。 though the squaring of the circle by means of the lunules



is not contentious; Bryson's solution is contentious: and the former



argument cannot be adapted to any subject except geometry; because



it proceeds from principles that are peculiar to geometry; whereas the



latter can be adapted as an argument against all the number of



people who do not know what is or is not possible in each particular



context: for it will apply to them all。 Or there is the method whereby



Antiphon squared the circle。 Or again; an argument which denied that



it was better to take a walk after dinner; because of Zeno's argument;



would not be a proper argument for a doctor; because Zeno's argument



is of general application。 If; then; the relation of the contentious



argument to the dialectical were exactly like that of the drawer of



false diagrams to the geometrician; a contentious argument upon the



aforesaid subjects could not have existed。 But; as it is; the



dialectical argument is not concerned with any definite kind of being;



nor does it show anything; nor is it even an argument such as we



find in the general philosophy of being。 For all beings are not



contained in any one kind; nor; if they were; could they possibly fall



under the same principles。 Accordingly; no art that is a method of



showing the nature of anything proceeds by asking questions: for it



does not permit a man to grant whichever he likes of the two



alternatives in the question: for they will not both of them yield a



proof。 Dialectic; on the other hand; does proceed by questioning;



whereas if it were concerned to show things; it would have refrained



from putting questions; even if not about everything; at least about



the first principles and the special principles that apply to the



particular subject in hand。 For suppose the answerer not to grant



these; it would then no longer have had any grounds from which to



argue any longer against the objection。 Dialectic is at the same



time a mode of examination as well。 For neither is the art of



examination an accomplishment of the same kind as geometry; but one



which a man may possess; even though he has not knowledge。 For it is



possible even for one without knowledge to hold an examination of



one who is without knowledge; if also the latter grants him points



taken not from thing that he knows or from the special principles of



the subject under discussion but from all that range of consequences



attaching to the subject which a man may indeed know without knowing



the theory of the subject; but which if he do not know; he is bound to



be ignorant of the theory。 So then clearly the art of examining does



not consist in knowledge of any definite subject。 For this reason;



too; it deals with everything: for every 'theory' of anything



employs also certain common principles。 Hence everybody; including



even amateurs; makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of



examining: for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who



profess to know things。 What serves them here is the general



principles: for they know these of themselves just as well as the



scientist; even if in what they say they seem to the latter to go



wildly astray from them。 All; then; are engaged in refutation; for



they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic



is concerned professionally; and he is a dialectician who examines



by the help of a theory of reasoning。 Now there are many identical



principles which are true of everything; though they are not such as



to constitute a particular nature; i。e。 a particular kind of being;



but are like negative terms; while other principles are not of this



kind but are special to particular subjects; accordingly it is



possible from these general principles to hold an examination on



everything; and that there should be a definite art of so doing;



and; moreover; an art which is not of the same kind as those which



demonstrate。 This is why the contentious reasoner does not stand in



the same condition in all respects as the drawer of a false diagram:



for the contentious reasoner will not be given to misreasoning from



any definite class of principles; but will deal with every class。



  These; then; are the types of sophistical refutations: and that it



belongs to the dialectician to study these; and to be able to effect



them; is not difficult to see: for the investigation of premisses



comprises the whole of this study。







                                12







  So much; then; for apparent refutations。 As for showing that the



answerer is committing some fallacy; and drawing his argument into



paradox…for this was the second item of the sophist's programme…in the



first place; then; this is best brought about by a certain manner of



questioning and through the question。 For to put the question



without framing it with reference to any definite subject is a good



bait for these purposes: for people are more inclined to make mistakes



when they talk at large; and they talk at large when they have no



definite subject before them。 Also the putting of several questions;



even though th
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