on sophistical refutations-第7部分

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be　directed　against　the　thought。　Such　being　the　meanings　of　the



phrases　in　question；　they　clearly　cannot　describe　two　separate　classes



of　argument。　For；　in　the　first　place；　it　is　possible　for　any　such



argument　as　bears　more　than　one　meaning　to　be　directed　against　the



expression　and　against　the　thought；　and　next　it　is　possible　for　any



argument　whatsoever；　for　the　fact　of　being　directed　against　the



thought　consists　not　in　the　nature　of　the　argument；　but　in　the　special



attitude　of　the　answerer　towards　the　points　he　concedes。　Next；　all



of　them　may　be　directed　to　the　expression。　For　'to　be　directed　against



the　expression'　means　in　this　doctrine　'not　to　be　directed　against　the



thought'。　For　if　not　all　are　directed　against　either　expression　or



thought；　there　will　be　certain　other　arguments　directed　neither



against　the　expression　nor　against　the　thought；　whereas　they　say



that　all　must　be　one　or　the　other；　and　divide　them　all　as　directed



either　against　the　expression　or　against　the　thought；　while　others



（they　say）　there　are　none。　But　in　point　of　fact　those　that　depend　on



mere　expression　are　only　a　branch　of　those　syllogisms　that　depend　on　a



multiplicity　of　meanings。　For　the　absurd　statement　has　actually　been



made　that　the　description　'dependent　on　mere　expression'　describes　all



the　arguments　that　depend　on　language：　whereas　some　of　these　are



fallacies　not　because　the　answerer　adopts　a　particular　attitude



towards　them；　but　because　the　argument　itself　involves　the　asking　of　a



question　such　as　bears　more　than　one　meaning。



　　It　is；　too；　altogether　absurd　to　discuss　Refutation　without　first



discussing　Proof：　for　a　refutation　is　a　proof；　so　that　one　ought　to



discuss　proof　as　well　before　describing　false　refutation：　for　a



refutation　of　that　kind　is　a　merely　apparent　proof　of　the



contradictory　of　a　thesis。　Accordingly；　the　reason　of　the　falsity　will



be　either　in　the　proof　or　in　the　contradiction　（for　mention　of　the



'contradiction'　must　be　added）；　while　sometimes　it　is　in　both；　if



the　refutation　be　merely　apparent。　In　the　argument　that　speaking　of



the　silent　is　possible　it　lies　in　the　contradiction；　not　in　the　proof；



in　the　argument　that　one　can　give　what　one　does　not　possess；　it　lies



in　both；　in　the　proof　that　Homer's　poem　is　a　figure　through　its



being　a　cycle　it　lies　in　the　proof。　An　argument　that　does　not　fail



in　either　respect　is　a　true　proof。



　　But；　to　return　to　the　point　whence　our　argument　digressed；　are



mathematical　reasonings　directed　against　the　thought；　or　not？　And　if



any　one　thinks　'triangle'　to　be　a　word　with　many　meanings；　and　granted



it　in　some　different　sense　from　the　figure　which　was　proved　to　contain



two　right　angles；　has　the　questioner　here　directed　his　argument



against　the　thought　of　the　former　or　not？



　　Moreover；　if　the　expression　bears　many　senses；　while　the　answerer



does　not　understand　or　suppose　it　to　have　them；　surely　the



questioner　here　has　directed　his　argument　against　his　thought！　Or



how　else　ought　he　to　put　his　question　except　by　suggesting　a



distinction…suppose　one's　question　to　be　speaking　of　the　silent



possible　or　not？'…as　follows；　'Is　the　answer　〃No〃　in　one　sense；　but



〃Yes〃　in　another？'　If；　then；　any　one　were　to　answer　that　it　was　not



possible　in　any　sense　and　the　other　were　to　argue　that　it　was；　has　not



his　argument　been　directed　against　the　thought　of　the　answerer？　Yet



his　argument　is　supposed　to　be　one　of　those　that　depend　on　the



expression。　There　is　not；　then；　any　definite　kind　of　arguments　that　is



directed　against　the　thought。　Some　arguments　are；　indeed；　directed



against　the　expression：　but　these　are　not　all　even　apparent



refutations；　let　alone　all　refutations。　For　there　are　also　apparent



refutations　which　do　not　depend　upon　language；　e。g。　those　that



depend　upon　accident；　and　others。



　　If；　however；　any　one　claims　that　one　should　actually　draw　the



distinction；　and　say；　'By　〃speaking　of　the　silent〃　I　mean；　in　one



sense　this　and　in　the　other　sense　that'；　surely　to　claim　this　is　in



the　first　place　absurd　（for　sometimes　the　questioner　does　not　see



the　ambiguity　of　his　question；　and　he　cannot　possibly　draw　a



distinction　which　he　does　not　think　to　be　there）：　in　the　second　place；



what　else　but　this　will　didactic　argument　be？　For　it　will　make



manifest　the　state　of　the　case　to　one　who　has　never　considered；　and



does　not　know　or　suppose　that　there　is　any　other　meaning　but　one。



For　what　is　there　to　prevent　the　same　thing　also　happening　to　us　in



cases　where　there　is　no　double　meaning？　'Are　the　units　in　four　equal



to　the　twos？　Observe　that　the　twos　are　contained　in　four　in　one



sense　in　this　way；　in　another　sense　in　that'。　Also；　'Is　the



knowledge　of　contraries　one　or　not？　Observe　that　some　contraries　are



known；　while　others　are　unknown'。　Thus　the　man　who　makes　this　claim



seems　to　be　unaware　of　the　difference　between　didactic　and　dialectical



argument；　and　of　the　fact　that　while　he　who　argues　didactically　should



not　ask　questions　but　make　things　clear　himself；　the　other　should



merely　ask　questions。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　11







　　Moreover；　to　claim　a　'Yes'　or　'No'　answer　is　the　business　not　of　a



man　who　is　showing　something；　but　of　one　who　is　holding　an



examination。　For　the　art　of　examining　is　a　branch　of　dialectic　and　has



in　view　not　the　man　who　has　knowledge；　but　the　ignorant　pretender。　He；



then；　is　a　dialectician　who　regards　the　common　principles　with　their



application　to　the　particular　matter　in　hand；　while　he　who　only



appears　to　do　this　is　a　sophist。　Now　for　contentious　and　sophistical



reasoning：　（1）　one　such　is　a　merely　apparent　reasoning；　on　subjects　on



which　dialectical　reasoning　is　the　proper　method　of　examination；



even　though　its　conclusion　be　true：　for　it　misleads　us　in　regard　to



the　cause：　also　（2）　there　are　those　misreasonings　which　do　not　conform



to　the　line　of　inquiry　proper　to　the　particular　subject；　but　are



generally　thought　to　conform　to　the　art　in　question。　For　false



diagrams　of　geometrical　figures　are　not　contentious　（for　the　resulting



fallacies　conform　to　the　subject　of　the　art）…any　more　than　is　any



false　diagram　that　may　be　offered　in　proof　of　a　truth…e。g。



Hippocrates'　figure　or　the　squaring　of　the　circle　by　means　of　the



lunules。　But　Bryson's　method　of　squaring　the　circle；　even　if　the



circle　is　thereby　squared；　is　still　sophistical　because　it　does　not



conform　to　the　subject　in　hand。　So；　then；　any　merely　apparent



reasoning　about　these　things　is　a　contentious　argument；　and　any



reasoning　that　merely　appears　to　conform　to　the　subject　in　hand；



even　though　it　be　genuine　reasoning；　is　a　contentious　argument：　for　it



is　merely　apparent　in　its　conformity　to　the　subject…matter；　so　that　it



is　deceptive　and　plays　foul。　For　just　as　a　foul　in　a　race　is　a



definite　type　of　fault；　and　is　a　kind　of　fo