on sophistical refutations-第6部分

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grant　if　he　were　asked。　Of　course；　in　some　cases　the　moment　we　add　the



missing　question；　we　also　show　up　its　falsity；　e。g。　in　fallacies



that　depend　on　language　and　on　solecism。　If　then；　fallacious　proofs　of



the　contradictory　of　a　thesis　depend　on　their　appearing　to　refute；



it　is　clear　that　the　considerations　on　which　both　proofs　of　false



conclusions　and　an　apparent　refutation　depend　must　be　the　same　in



number。　Now　an　apparent　refutation　depends　upon　the　elements



involved　in　a　genuine　one：　for　the　failure　of　one　or　other　of　these



must　make　the　refutation　merely　apparent；　e。g。　that　which　depends　on



the　failure　of　the　conclusion　to　follow　from　the　argument　（the



argument　ad　impossible）　and　that　which　treats　two　questions　as　one　and



so　depends　upon　a　flaw　in　the　premiss；　and　that　which　depends　on　the



substitution　of　an　accident　for　an　essential　attribute；　and…a　branch



of　the　last…that　which　depends　upon　the　consequent：　more　over；　the



conclusion　may　follow　not　in　fact　but　only　verbally：　then；　instead



of　proving　the　contradictory　universally　and　in　the　same　respect　and



relation　and　manner；　the　fallacy　may　be　dependent　on　some　limit　of



extent　or　on　one　or　other　of　these　qualifications：　moreover；　there



is　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　to　be　proved；　in　violation



of　the　clause　'without　reckoning　in　the　original　point'。　Thus　we



should　have　the　number　of　considerations　on　which　the　fallacious



proofs　depend：　for　they　could　not　depend　on　more；　but　all　will



depend　on　the　points　aforesaid。



　　A　sophistical　refutation　is　a　refutation　not　absolutely　but



relatively　to　some　one：　and　so　is　a　proof；　in　the　same　way。　For　unless



that　which　depends　upon　ambiguity　assumes　that　the　ambiguous　term



has　a　single　meaning；　and　that　which　depends　on　like　verbal　forms



assumes　that　substance　is　the　only　category；　and　the　rest　in　the



same　way；　there　will　be　neither　refutations　nor　proofs；　either



absolutely　or　relatively　to　the　answerer：　whereas　if　they　do　assume



these　things；　they　will　stand；　relatively　to　the　answerer；　but



absolutely　they　will　not　stand：　for　they　have　not　secured　a



statement　that　does　have　a　single　meaning；　but　only　one　that　appears



to　have；　and　that　only　from　this　particular　man。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　9







　　The　number　of　considerations　on　which　depend　the　refutations　of



those　who　are　refuted；　we　ought　not　to　try　to　grasp　without　a



knowledge　of　everything　that　is。　This；　however；　is　not　the　province　of



any　special　study：　for　possibly　the　sciences　are　infinite　in　number；



so　that　obviously　demonstrations　may　be　infinite　too。　Now



refutations　may　be　true　as　well　as　false：　for　whenever　it　is



possible　to　demonstrate　something；　it　is　also　possible　to　refute　the



man　who　maintains　the　contradictory　of　the　truth；　e。g。　if　a　man　has



stated　that　the　diagonal　is　commensurate　with　the　side　of　the



square；　one　might　refute　him　by　demonstrating　that　it　is



incommensurate。　Accordingly；　to　exhaust　all　possible　refutations　we



shall　have　to　have　scientific　knowledge　of　everything：　for　some



refutations　depend　upon　the　principles　that　rule　in　geometry　and　the



conclusions　that　follow　from　these；　others　upon　those　that　rule　in



medicine；　and　others　upon　those　of　the　other　sciences。　For　the



matter　of　that；　the　false　refutations　likewise　belong　to　the　number　of



the　infinite：　for　according　to　every　art　there　is　false　proof；　e。g。



according　to　geometry　there　is　false　geometrical　proof；　and



according　to　medicine　there　is　false　medical　proof。　By　'according　to



the　art'；　I　mean　'according　to　the　principles　of　it'。　Clearly；　then；



it　is　not　of　all　refutations；　but　only　of　those　that　depend　upon



dialectic　that　we　need　to　grasp　the　common…place　rules：　for　these



stand　in　a　common　relation　to　every　art　and　faculty。　And　as　regards



the　refutation　that　is　according　to　one　or　other　of　the　particular



sciences　it　is　the　task　of　that　particular　scientist　to　examine



whether　it　is　merely　apparent　without　being　real；　and；　if　it　be



real；　what　is　the　reason　for　it：　whereas　it　is　the　business　of



dialecticians　so　to　examine　the　refutation　that　proceeds　from　the



common　first　principles　that　fall　under　no　particular　special　study。



For　if　we　grasp　the　startingpoints　of　the　accepted　proofs　on　any



subject　whatever　we　grasp　those　of　the　refutations　current　on　that



subject。　For　a　refutation　is　the　proof　of　the　contradictory　of　a　given



thesis；　so　that　either　one　or　two　proofs　of　the　contradictory



constitute　a　refutation。　We　grasp；　then；　the　number　of



considerations　on　which　all　such　depend：　if；　however；　we　grasp　this；



we　also　grasp　their　solutions　as　well；　for　the　objections　to　these　are



the　solutions　of　them。　We　also　grasp　the　number　of　considerations　on



which　those　refutations　depend；　that　are　merely　apparent…apparent；　I



mean；　not　to　everybody；　but　to　people　of　a　certain　stamp；　for　it　is　an



indefinite　task　if　one　is　to　inquire　how　many　are　the　considerations



that　make　them　apparent　to　the　man　in　the　street。　Accordingly　it　is



clear　that　the　dialectician's　business　is　to　be　able　to　grasp　on　how



many　considerations　depends　the　formation；　through　the　common　first



principles；　of　a　refutation　that　is　either　real　or　apparent；　i。e。



either　dialectical　or　apparently　dialectical；　or　suitable　for　an



examination。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　10







　　It　is　no　true　distinction　between　arguments　which　some　people　draw



when　they　say　that　some　arguments　are　directed　against　the　expression；



and　others　against　the　thought　expressed：　for　it　is　absurd　to



suppose　that　some　arguments　are　directed　against　the　expression　and



others　against　the　thought；　and　that　they　are　not　the　same。　For　what



is　failure　to　direct　an　argument　against　the　thought　except　what



occurs　whenever　a　man　does　not　in　using　the　expression　think　it　to



be　used　in　his　question　in　the　same　sense　in　which　the　person



questioned　granted　it？　And　this　is　the　same　thing　as　to　direct　the



argument　against　the　expression。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　directed



against　the　thought　whenever　a　man　uses　the　expression　in　the　same



sense　which　the　answerer　had　in　mind　when　he　granted　it。　If　now　any



（i。e。　both　the　questioner　and　the　person　questioned）；　in　dealing



with　an　expression　with　more　than　one　meaning；　were　to　suppose　it　to



have　one　meaning…as　e。g。　it　may　be　that　'Being'　and　'One'　have　many



meanings；　and　yet　both　the　answerer　answers　and　the　questioner　puts



his　question　supposing　it　to　be　one；　and　the　argument　is　to　the　effect



that　'All　things　are　one'…will　this　discussion　be　directed　any　more



against　the　expression　than　against　the　thought　of　the　person



questioned？　If；　on　the　other　hand；　one　of　them　supposes　the　expression



to　have　many　meanings；　it　is　clear　that　such　a　discussion　will　not



be　directed　against　the　thought。　Such　being　the