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on sophistical refutations-第6部分

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grant if he were asked。 Of course; in some cases the moment we add the



missing question; we also show up its falsity; e。g。 in fallacies



that depend on language and on solecism。 If then; fallacious proofs of



the contradictory of a thesis depend on their appearing to refute;



it is clear that the considerations on which both proofs of false



conclusions and an apparent refutation depend must be the same in



number。 Now an apparent refutation depends upon the elements



involved in a genuine one: for the failure of one or other of these



must make the refutation merely apparent; e。g。 that which depends on



the failure of the conclusion to follow from the argument (the



argument ad impossible) and that which treats two questions as one and



so depends upon a flaw in the premiss; and that which depends on the



substitution of an accident for an essential attribute; and…a branch



of the last…that which depends upon the consequent: more over; the



conclusion may follow not in fact but only verbally: then; instead



of proving the contradictory universally and in the same respect and



relation and manner; the fallacy may be dependent on some limit of



extent or on one or other of these qualifications: moreover; there



is the assumption of the original point to be proved; in violation



of the clause 'without reckoning in the original point'。 Thus we



should have the number of considerations on which the fallacious



proofs depend: for they could not depend on more; but all will



depend on the points aforesaid。



  A sophistical refutation is a refutation not absolutely but



relatively to some one: and so is a proof; in the same way。 For unless



that which depends upon ambiguity assumes that the ambiguous term



has a single meaning; and that which depends on like verbal forms



assumes that substance is the only category; and the rest in the



same way; there will be neither refutations nor proofs; either



absolutely or relatively to the answerer: whereas if they do assume



these things; they will stand; relatively to the answerer; but



absolutely they will not stand: for they have not secured a



statement that does have a single meaning; but only one that appears



to have; and that only from this particular man。







                                 9







  The number of considerations on which depend the refutations of



those who are refuted; we ought not to try to grasp without a



knowledge of everything that is。 This; however; is not the province of



any special study: for possibly the sciences are infinite in number;



so that obviously demonstrations may be infinite too。 Now



refutations may be true as well as false: for whenever it is



possible to demonstrate something; it is also possible to refute the



man who maintains the contradictory of the truth; e。g。 if a man has



stated that the diagonal is commensurate with the side of the



square; one might refute him by demonstrating that it is



incommensurate。 Accordingly; to exhaust all possible refutations we



shall have to have scientific knowledge of everything: for some



refutations depend upon the principles that rule in geometry and the



conclusions that follow from these; others upon those that rule in



medicine; and others upon those of the other sciences。 For the



matter of that; the false refutations likewise belong to the number of



the infinite: for according to every art there is false proof; e。g。



according to geometry there is false geometrical proof; and



according to medicine there is false medical proof。 By 'according to



the art'; I mean 'according to the principles of it'。 Clearly; then;



it is not of all refutations; but only of those that depend upon



dialectic that we need to grasp the common…place rules: for these



stand in a common relation to every art and faculty。 And as regards



the refutation that is according to one or other of the particular



sciences it is the task of that particular scientist to examine



whether it is merely apparent without being real; and; if it be



real; what is the reason for it: whereas it is the business of



dialecticians so to examine the refutation that proceeds from the



common first principles that fall under no particular special study。



For if we grasp the startingpoints of the accepted proofs on any



subject whatever we grasp those of the refutations current on that



subject。 For a refutation is the proof of the contradictory of a given



thesis; so that either one or two proofs of the contradictory



constitute a refutation。 We grasp; then; the number of



considerations on which all such depend: if; however; we grasp this;



we also grasp their solutions as well; for the objections to these are



the solutions of them。 We also grasp the number of considerations on



which those refutations depend; that are merely apparent…apparent; I



mean; not to everybody; but to people of a certain stamp; for it is an



indefinite task if one is to inquire how many are the considerations



that make them apparent to the man in the street。 Accordingly it is



clear that the dialectician's business is to be able to grasp on how



many considerations depends the formation; through the common first



principles; of a refutation that is either real or apparent; i。e。



either dialectical or apparently dialectical; or suitable for an



examination。







                                10







  It is no true distinction between arguments which some people draw



when they say that some arguments are directed against the expression;



and others against the thought expressed: for it is absurd to



suppose that some arguments are directed against the expression and



others against the thought; and that they are not the same。 For what



is failure to direct an argument against the thought except what



occurs whenever a man does not in using the expression think it to



be used in his question in the same sense in which the person



questioned granted it? And this is the same thing as to direct the



argument against the expression。 On the other hand; it is directed



against the thought whenever a man uses the expression in the same



sense which the answerer had in mind when he granted it。 If now any



(i。e。 both the questioner and the person questioned); in dealing



with an expression with more than one meaning; were to suppose it to



have one meaning…as e。g。 it may be that 'Being' and 'One' have many



meanings; and yet both the answerer answers and the questioner puts



his question supposing it to be one; and the argument is to the effect



that 'All things are one'…will this discussion be directed any more



against the expression than against the thought of the person



questioned? If; on the other hand; one of them supposes the expression



to have many meanings; it is clear that such a discussion will not



be directed against the thought。 Such being the 
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