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on sophistical refutations-第4部分

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one; and either confess their defeat by failing to answer the



question; or are exposed to an apparent refutation。 Thus 'Is A and



is B a man?' 'Yes。' 'Then if any one hits A and B; he will strike a



man' (singular);'not men' (plural)。 Or again; where part is good and



part bad; 'is the whole good or bad?' For whichever he says; it is



possible that he might be thought to expose himself to an apparent



refutation or to make an apparently false statement: for to say that



something is good which is not good; or not good which is good; is



to make a false statement。 Sometimes; however; additional premisses



may actually give rise to a genuine refutation; e。g。 suppose a man



were to grant that the descriptions 'white' and 'naked' and 'blind'



apply to one thing and to a number of things in a like sense。 For if



'blind' describes a thing that cannot see though nature designed it to



see; it will also describe things that cannot see though nature



designed them to do so。 Whenever; then; one thing can see while



another cannot; they will either both be able to see or else both be



blind; which is impossible。







                                 6







  The right way; then; is either to divide apparent proofs and



refutations as above; or else to refer them all to ignorance of what



'refutation' is; and make that our starting…point: for it is



possible to analyse all the aforesaid modes of fallacy into breaches



of the definition of a refutation。 In the first place; we may see if



they are inconclusive: for the conclusion ought to result from the



premisses laid down; so as to compel us necessarily to state it and



not merely to seem to compel us。 Next we should also take the



definition bit by bit; and try the fallacy thereby。 For of the



fallacies that consist in language; some depend upon a double meaning;



e。g。 ambiguity of words and of phrases; and the fallacy of like verbal



forms (for we habitually speak of everything as though it were a



particular substance)…while fallacies of combination and division



and accent arise because the phrase in question or the term as altered



is not the same as was intended。 Even this; however; should be the



same; just as the thing signified should be as well; if a refutation



or proof is to be effected; e。g。 if the point concerns a doublet; then



you should draw the conclusion of a 'doublet'; not of a 'cloak'。 For



the former conclusion also would be true; but it has not been



proved; we need a further question to show that 'doublet' means the



same thing; in order to satisfy any one who asks why you think your



point proved。



  Fallacies that depend on Accident are clear cases of ignoratio



elenchi when once 'proof' has been defined。 For the same definition



ought to hold good of 'refutation' too; except that a mention of



'the contradictory' is here added: for a refutation is a proof of



the contradictory。 If; then; there is no proof as regards an



accident of anything; there is no refutation。 For supposing; when A



and B are; C must necessarily be; and C is white; there is no



necessity for it to be white on account of the syllogism。 So; if the



triangle has its angles equal to two right…angles; and it happens to



be a figure; or the simplest element or starting point; it is not



because it is a figure or a starting point or simplest element that it



has this character。 For the demonstration proves the point about it



not qua figure or qua simplest element; but qua triangle。 Likewise



also in other cases。 If; then; refutation is a proof; an argument



which argued per accidens could not be a refutation。 It is; however;



just in this that the experts and men of science generally suffer



refutation at the hand of the unscientific: for the latter meet the



scientists with reasonings constituted per accidens; and the



scientists for lack of the power to draw distinctions either say 'Yes'



to their questions; or else people suppose them to have said 'Yes';



although they have not。



  Those that depend upon whether something is said in a certain



respect only or said absolutely; are clear cases of ignoratio



elenchi because the affirmation and the denial are not concerned



with the same point。 For of 'white in a certain respect' the



negation is 'not white in a certain respect'; while of 'white



absolutely' it is 'not white; absolutely'。 If; then; a man treats



the admission that a thing is 'white in a certain respect' as though



it were said to be white absolutely; he does not effect a



refutation; but merely appears to do so owing to ignorance of what



refutation is。



  The clearest cases of all; however; are those that were previously



described' as depending upon the definition of a 'refutation': and



this is also why they were called by that name。 For the appearance



of a refutation is produced because of the omission in the definition;



and if we divide fallacies in the above manner; we ought to set



'Defective definition' as a common mark upon them all。



  Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon



stating as the cause what is not the cause; are clearly shown to be



cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof。 For the



conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so'; and this



does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it: and again it



should come about without taking into account the original point;



and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon



begging the original point。



  Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon



stating as the cause what is not the cause; are clearly shown to be



cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof。 For the



conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so'; and this



does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it: and again it



should come about without taking into account the original point;



and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon



begging the original point。



    Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident:



for the consequent is an accident; only it differs from the accident



in this; that you may secure an admission of the accident in the



case of one thing only (e。g。 the identity of a yellow thing and



honey and of a white thing and swan); whereas the consequent always



involves more than one thing: for we claim that things that are the



same as one and the same thing are also the same as one another; and



this is the ground of a refutation dependent on the consequent。 It is;



however; not always true; e。g。 suppose that and B are the same as C



per accidens; for both 'snow' and the 'swan' are the same as something



white'。 Or again; as in Melissus' argument; a man assumes that to



'have been generated' and to 'have a beginning' are the same thing; or



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