on sophistical refutations-第4部分

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one；　and　either　confess　their　defeat　by　failing　to　answer　the



question；　or　are　exposed　to　an　apparent　refutation。　Thus　'Is　A　and



is　B　a　man？'　'Yes。'　'Then　if　any　one　hits　A　and　B；　he　will　strike　a



man'　（singular）；'not　men'　（plural）。　Or　again；　where　part　is　good　and



part　bad；　'is　the　whole　good　or　bad？'　For　whichever　he　says；　it　is



possible　that　he　might　be　thought　to　expose　himself　to　an　apparent



refutation　or　to　make　an　apparently　false　statement：　for　to　say　that



something　is　good　which　is　not　good；　or　not　good　which　is　good；　is



to　make　a　false　statement。　Sometimes；　however；　additional　premisses



may　actually　give　rise　to　a　genuine　refutation；　e。g。　suppose　a　man



were　to　grant　that　the　descriptions　'white'　and　'naked'　and　'blind'



apply　to　one　thing　and　to　a　number　of　things　in　a　like　sense。　For　if



'blind'　describes　a　thing　that　cannot　see　though　nature　designed　it　to



see；　it　will　also　describe　things　that　cannot　see　though　nature



designed　them　to　do　so。　Whenever；　then；　one　thing　can　see　while



another　cannot；　they　will　either　both　be　able　to　see　or　else　both　be



blind；　which　is　impossible。







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　　The　right　way；　then；　is　either　to　divide　apparent　proofs　and



refutations　as　above；　or　else　to　refer　them　all　to　ignorance　of　what



'refutation'　is；　and　make　that　our　starting…point：　for　it　is



possible　to　analyse　all　the　aforesaid　modes　of　fallacy　into　breaches



of　the　definition　of　a　refutation。　In　the　first　place；　we　may　see　if



they　are　inconclusive：　for　the　conclusion　ought　to　result　from　the



premisses　laid　down；　so　as　to　compel　us　necessarily　to　state　it　and



not　merely　to　seem　to　compel　us。　Next　we　should　also　take　the



definition　bit　by　bit；　and　try　the　fallacy　thereby。　For　of　the



fallacies　that　consist　in　language；　some　depend　upon　a　double　meaning；



e。g。　ambiguity　of　words　and　of　phrases；　and　the　fallacy　of　like　verbal



forms　（for　we　habitually　speak　of　everything　as　though　it　were　a



particular　substance）…while　fallacies　of　combination　and　division



and　accent　arise　because　the　phrase　in　question　or　the　term　as　altered



is　not　the　same　as　was　intended。　Even　this；　however；　should　be　the



same；　just　as　the　thing　signified　should　be　as　well；　if　a　refutation



or　proof　is　to　be　effected；　e。g。　if　the　point　concerns　a　doublet；　then



you　should　draw　the　conclusion　of　a　'doublet'；　not　of　a　'cloak'。　For



the　former　conclusion　also　would　be　true；　but　it　has　not　been



proved；　we　need　a　further　question　to　show　that　'doublet'　means　the



same　thing；　in　order　to　satisfy　any　one　who　asks　why　you　think　your



point　proved。



　　Fallacies　that　depend　on　Accident　are　clear　cases　of　ignoratio



elenchi　when　once　'proof'　has　been　defined。　For　the　same　definition



ought　to　hold　good　of　'refutation'　too；　except　that　a　mention　of



'the　contradictory'　is　here　added：　for　a　refutation　is　a　proof　of



the　contradictory。　If；　then；　there　is　no　proof　as　regards　an



accident　of　anything；　there　is　no　refutation。　For　supposing；　when　A



and　B　are；　C　must　necessarily　be；　and　C　is　white；　there　is　no



necessity　for　it　to　be　white　on　account　of　the　syllogism。　So；　if　the



triangle　has　its　angles　equal　to　two　right…angles；　and　it　happens　to



be　a　figure；　or　the　simplest　element　or　starting　point；　it　is　not



because　it　is　a　figure　or　a　starting　point　or　simplest　element　that　it



has　this　character。　For　the　demonstration　proves　the　point　about　it



not　qua　figure　or　qua　simplest　element；　but　qua　triangle。　Likewise



also　in　other　cases。　If；　then；　refutation　is　a　proof；　an　argument



which　argued　per　accidens　could　not　be　a　refutation。　It　is；　however；



just　in　this　that　the　experts　and　men　of　science　generally　suffer



refutation　at　the　hand　of　the　unscientific：　for　the　latter　meet　the



scientists　with　reasonings　constituted　per　accidens；　and　the



scientists　for　lack　of　the　power　to　draw　distinctions　either　say　'Yes'



to　their　questions；　or　else　people　suppose　them　to　have　said　'Yes'；



although　they　have　not。



　　Those　that　depend　upon　whether　something　is　said　in　a　certain



respect　only　or　said　absolutely；　are　clear　cases　of　ignoratio



elenchi　because　the　affirmation　and　the　denial　are　not　concerned



with　the　same　point。　For　of　'white　in　a　certain　respect'　the



negation　is　'not　white　in　a　certain　respect'；　while　of　'white



absolutely'　it　is　'not　white；　absolutely'。　If；　then；　a　man　treats



the　admission　that　a　thing　is　'white　in　a　certain　respect'　as　though



it　were　said　to　be　white　absolutely；　he　does　not　effect　a



refutation；　but　merely　appears　to　do　so　owing　to　ignorance　of　what



refutation　is。



　　The　clearest　cases　of　all；　however；　are　those　that　were　previously



described'　as　depending　upon　the　definition　of　a　'refutation'：　and



this　is　also　why　they　were　called　by　that　name。　For　the　appearance



of　a　refutation　is　produced　because　of　the　omission　in　the　definition；



and　if　we　divide　fallacies　in　the　above　manner；　we　ought　to　set



'Defective　definition'　as　a　common　mark　upon　them　all。



　　Those　that　depend　upon　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　and　upon



stating　as　the　cause　what　is　not　the　cause；　are　clearly　shown　to　be



cases　of　ignoratio　elenchi　through　the　definition　thereof。　For　the



conclusion　ought　to　come　about　'because　these　things　are　so'；　and　this



does　not　happen　where　the　premisses　are　not　causes　of　it：　and　again　it



should　come　about　without　taking　into　account　the　original　point；



and　this　is　not　the　case　with　those　arguments　which　depend　upon



begging　the　original　point。



　　Those　that　depend　upon　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　and　upon



stating　as　the　cause　what　is　not　the　cause；　are　clearly　shown　to　be



cases　of　ignoratio　elenchi　through　the　definition　thereof。　For　the



conclusion　ought　to　come　about　'because　these　things　are　so'；　and　this



does　not　happen　where　the　premisses　are　not　causes　of　it：　and　again　it



should　come　about　without　taking　into　account　the　original　point；



and　this　is　not　the　case　with　those　arguments　which　depend　upon



begging　the　original　point。



　　　　Those　that　depend　upon　the　consequent　are　a　branch　of　Accident：



for　the　consequent　is　an　accident；　only　it　differs　from　the　accident



in　this；　that　you　may　secure　an　admission　of　the　accident　in　the



case　of　one　thing　only　（e。g。　the　identity　of　a　yellow　thing　and



honey　and　of　a　white　thing　and　swan）；　whereas　the　consequent　always



involves　more　than　one　thing：　for　we　claim　that　things　that　are　the



same　as　one　and　the　same　thing　are　also　the　same　as　one　another；　and



this　is　the　ground　of　a　refutation　dependent　on　the　consequent。　It　is；



however；　not　always　true；　e。g。　suppose　that　and　B　are　the　same　as　C



per　accidens；　for　both　'snow'　and　the　'swan'　are　the　same　as　something



white'。　Or　again；　as　in　Melissus'　argument；　a　man　assumes　that　to



'have　been　generated'　and　to　'have　a　beginning'　are　the　same　thing；　or