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on sophistical refutations-第3部分

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of being; e。g。 if it is not a man。' For it is not the same thing



'not to be x' and 'not to be' at all: it looks as if it were;



because of the closeness of the expression; i。e。 because 'to be x'



is but little different from 'to be'; and 'not to be x' from 'not to



be'。 Likewise also with any argument that turns upon the point whether



an expression is used in a certain respect or used absolutely。 Thus



e。g。 'Suppose an Indian to be black all over; but white in respect



of his teeth; then he is both white and not white。' Or if both



characters belong in a particular respect; then; they say; 'contrary



attributes belong at the same time'。 This kind of thing is in some



cases easily seen by any one; e。g。 suppose a man were to secure the



statement that the Ethiopian is black; and were then to ask whether he



is white in respect of his teeth; and then; if he be white in that



respect; were to suppose at the conclusion of his questions that



therefore he had proved dialectically that he was both white and not



white。 But in some cases it often passes undetected; viz。 in all cases



where; whenever a statement is made of something in a certain respect;



it would be generally thought that the absolute statement follows as



well; and also in all cases where it is not easy to see which of the



attributes ought to be rendered strictly。 A situation of this kind



arises; where both the opposite attributes belong alike: for then



there is general support for the view that one must agree absolutely



to the assertion of both; or of neither: e。g。 if a thing is half white



and half black; is it white or black?



  Other fallacies occur because the terms 'proof' or 'refutation' have



not been defined; and because something is left out in their



definition。 For to refute is to contradict one and the same



attribute…not merely the name; but the reality…and a name that is



not merely synonymous but the same name…and to confute it from the



propositions granted; necessarily; without including in the



reckoning the original point to be proved; in the same respect and



relation and manner and time in which it was asserted。 A 'false



assertion' about anything has to be defined in the same way。 Some



people; however; omit some one of the said conditions and give a



merely apparent refutation; showing (e。g。) that the same thing is both



double and not double: for two is double of one; but not double of



three。 Or; it may be; they show that it is both double and not



double of the same thing; but not that it is so in the same respect:



for it is double in length but not double in breadth。 Or; it may be;



they show it to be both double and not double of the same thing and in



the same respect and manner; but not that it is so at the same time:



and therefore their refutation is merely apparent。 One might; with



some violence; bring this fallacy into the group of fallacies



dependent on language as well。



  Those that depend on the assumption of the original point to be



proved; occur in the same way; and in as many ways; as it is



possible to beg the original point; they appear to refute because



men lack the power to keep their eyes at once upon what is the same



and what is different。



  The refutation which depends upon the consequent arises because



people suppose that the relation of consequence is convertible。 For



whenever; suppose A is; B necessarily is; they then suppose also



that if B is; A necessarily is。 This is also the source of the



deceptions that attend opinions based on sense…perception。 For



people often suppose bile to be honey because honey is attended by a



yellow colour: also; since after rain the ground is wet in



consequence; we suppose that if the ground is wet; it has been



raining; whereas that does not necessarily follow。 In rhetoric



proofs from signs are based on consequences。 For when rhetoricians



wish to show that a man is an adulterer; they take hold of some



consequence of an adulterous life; viz。 that the man is smartly



dressed; or that he is observed to wander about at night。 There are;



however; many people of whom these things are true; while the charge



in question is untrue。 It happens like this also in real reasoning;



e。g。 Melissus' argument; that the universe is eternal; assumes that



the universe has not come to be (for from what is not nothing could



possibly come to be) and that what has come to be has done so from a



first beginning。 If; therefore; the universe has not come to be; it



has no first beginning; and is therefore eternal。 But this does not



necessarily follow: for even if what has come to be always has a first



beginning; it does not also follow that what has a first beginning has



come to be; any more than it follows that if a man in a fever be



hot; a man who is hot must be in a fever。



  The refutation which depends upon treating as cause what is not a



cause; occurs whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the



argument; as though the refutation depended upon it。 This kind of



thing happens in arguments that reason ad impossible: for in these



we are bound to demolish one of the premisses。 If; then; the false



cause be reckoned in among the questions that are necessary to



establish the resulting impossibility; it will often be thought that



the refutation depends upon it; e。g。 in the proof that the 'soul'



and 'life' are not the same: for if coming…to…be be contrary to



perishing; then a particular form of perishing will have a



particular form of coming…to…be as its contrary: now death is a



particular form of perishing and is contrary to life: life; therefore;



is a coming to…be; and to live is to come…to…be。 But this is



impossible: accordingly; the 'soul' and 'life' are not the same。 Now



this is not proved: for the impossibility results all the same; even



if one does not say that life is the same as the soul; but merely says



that life is contrary to death; which is a form of perishing; and that



perishing has 'coming…to…be' as its contrary。 Arguments of that



kind; then; though not inconclusive absolutely; are inconclusive in



relation to the proposed conclusion。 Also even the questioners



themselves often fail quite as much to see a point of that kind。



  Such; then; are the arguments that depend upon the consequent and



upon false cause。 Those that depend upon the making of two questions



into one occur whenever the plurality is undetected and a single



answer is returned as if to a single question。 Now; in some cases;



it is easy to see that there is more than one; and that an answer is



not to be given; e。g。 'Does the earth consist of sea; or the sky?' But



in some cases it is less easy; and then people treat the question as



one; and either confess their defeat by failing to answer the



question; or are exposed to an apparent refutation。 Thus 'Is A and



is B a man?' 'Yes
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