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on sophistical refutations-第2部分

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ambiguity。 'Those learn who know: for it is those who know their



letters who learn the letters dictated to them'。 For to 'learn' is



ambiguous; it signifies both 'to understand' by the use of



knowledge; and also 'to acquire knowledge'。 Again; 'Evils are good:



for what needs to be is good; and evils must needs be'。 For 'what



needs to be' has a double meaning: it means what is inevitable; as



often is the case with evils; too (for evil of some kind is



inevitable); while on the other hand we say of good things as well



that they 'need to be'。 Moreover; 'The same man is both seated and



standing and he is both sick and in health: for it is he who stood



up who is standing; and he who is recovering who is in health: but



it is the seated man who stood up; and the sick man who was



recovering'。 For 'The sick man does so and so'; or 'has so and so done



to him' is not single in meaning: sometimes it means 'the man who is



sick or is seated now'; sometimes 'the man who was sick formerly'。



Of course; the man who was recovering was the sick man; who really was



sick at the time: but the man who is in health is not sick at the same



time: he is 'the sick man' in the sense not that he is sick now; but



that he was sick formerly。 Examples such as the following depend



upon amphiboly: 'I wish that you the enemy may capture'。 Also the



thesis; 'There must be knowledge of what one knows': for it is



possible by this phrase to mean that knowledge belongs to both the



knower and the known。 Also; 'There must be sight of what one sees: one



sees the pillar: ergo the pillar has sight'。 Also; 'What you profess



to…be; that you profess to…be: you profess a stone to…be: ergo you



profess…to…be a stone'。 Also; 'Speaking of the silent is possible':



for 'speaking of the silent' also has a double meaning: it may mean



that the speaker is silent or that the things of which he speaks are



so。 There are three varieties of these ambiguities and amphibolies:



(1) When either the expression or the name has strictly more than



one meaning; e。g。 aetos and the 'dog'; (2) when by custom we use



them so; (3) when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more



than one meaning in combination; e。g。 'knowing letters'。 For each



word; both 'knowing' and 'letters'; possibly has a single meaning: but



both together have more than one…either that the letters themselves



have knowledge or that someone else has it of them。



  Amphiboly and ambiguity; then; depend on these modes of speech。 Upon



the combination of words there depend instances such as the following:



'A man can walk while sitting; and can write while not writing'。 For



the meaning is not the same if one divides the words and if one



combines them in saying that 'it is possible to walk…while…sitting'



and write while not writing'。 The same applies to the latter phrase;



too; if one combines the words 'to write…while…not…writing': for



then it means that he has the power to write and not to write at once;



whereas if one does not combine them; it means that when he is not



writing he has the power to write。 Also; 'He now if he has learnt



his letters'。 Moreover; there is the saying that 'One single thing



if you can carry a crowd you can carry too'。



  Upon division depend the propositions that 5 is 2 and 3; and odd;



and that the greater is equal: for it is that amount and more besides。



For the same phrase would not be thought always to have the same



meaning when divided and when combined; e。g。 'I made thee a slave once



a free man'; and 'God…like Achilles left fifty a hundred men'。



  An argument depending upon accent it is not easy to construct in



unwritten discussion; in written discussions and in poetry it is



easier。 Thus (e。g。) some people emend Homer against those who



criticize as unnatural his expression to men ou kataputhetai



ombro。 For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent;



pronouncing the ou with an acuter accent。 Also; in the passage



about Agamemnon's dream; they say that Zeus did not himself say 'We



grant him the fulfilment of his prayer'; but that he bade the dream



grant it。 Instances such as these; then; turn upon the accentuation。



  Others come about owing to the form of expression used; when what is



really different is expressed in the same form; e。g。 a masculine thing



by a feminine termination; or a feminine thing by a masculine; or a



neuter by either a masculine or a feminine; or; again; when a



quality is expressed by a termination proper to quantity or vice



versa; or what is active by a passive word; or a state by an active



word; and so forth with the other divisions previously' laid down。 For



it is possible to use an expression to denote what does not belong



to the class of actions at all as though it did so belong。 Thus (e。g。)



'flourishing' is a word which in the form of its expression is like



'cutting' or 'building': yet the one denotes a certain quality…i。e。



a certain condition…while the other denotes a certain action。 In the



same manner also in the other instances。



  Refutations; then; that depend upon language are drawn from these



common…place rules。 Of fallacies; on the other hand; that are



independent of language there are seven kinds:



  (1) that which depends upon Accident:



  (2) the use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with



some qualification of respect or place; or time; or relation:



  (3) that which depends upon ignorance of what 'refutation' is:



  (4) that which depends upon the consequent:



  (5) that which depends upon assuming the original conclusion:



  (6) stating as cause what is not the cause:



  (7) the making of more than one question into one。







                                 5







  Fallacies; then; that depend on Accident occur whenever any



attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its



accident。 For since the same thing has many accidents there is no



necessity that all the same attributes should belong to all of a



thing's predicates and to their subject as well。 Thus (e。g。); 'If



Coriscus be different from 〃man〃; he is different from himself: for he



is a man': or 'If he be different from Socrates; and Socrates be a



man; then'; they say; 'he has admitted that Coriscus is different from



a man; because it so happens (accidit) that the person from whom he



said that he (Coriscus) is different is a man'。



  Those that depend on whether an expression is used absolutely or



in a certain respect and not strictly; occur whenever an expression



used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely;



e。g。 in the argument 'If what is not is the object of an opinion; then



what is not is': for it is not the same thing 'to be x' and 'to be'



absolutely。 Or again; 'What is; is not; if it is not a particular kind



of being; e。g。 if it is not a man。' For i
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