on sophistical refutations-第2部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！




ambiguity。　'Those　learn　who　know：　for　it　is　those　who　know　their



letters　who　learn　the　letters　dictated　to　them'。　For　to　'learn'　is



ambiguous；　it　signifies　both　'to　understand'　by　the　use　of



knowledge；　and　also　'to　acquire　knowledge'。　Again；　'Evils　are　good：



for　what　needs　to　be　is　good；　and　evils　must　needs　be'。　For　'what



needs　to　be'　has　a　double　meaning：　it　means　what　is　inevitable；　as



often　is　the　case　with　evils；　too　（for　evil　of　some　kind　is



inevitable）；　while　on　the　other　hand　we　say　of　good　things　as　well



that　they　'need　to　be'。　Moreover；　'The　same　man　is　both　seated　and



standing　and　he　is　both　sick　and　in　health：　for　it　is　he　who　stood



up　who　is　standing；　and　he　who　is　recovering　who　is　in　health：　but



it　is　the　seated　man　who　stood　up；　and　the　sick　man　who　was



recovering'。　For　'The　sick　man　does　so　and　so'；　or　'has　so　and　so　done



to　him'　is　not　single　in　meaning：　sometimes　it　means　'the　man　who　is



sick　or　is　seated　now'；　sometimes　'the　man　who　was　sick　formerly'。



Of　course；　the　man　who　was　recovering　was　the　sick　man；　who　really　was



sick　at　the　time：　but　the　man　who　is　in　health　is　not　sick　at　the　same



time：　he　is　'the　sick　man'　in　the　sense　not　that　he　is　sick　now；　but



that　he　was　sick　formerly。　Examples　such　as　the　following　depend



upon　amphiboly：　'I　wish　that　you　the　enemy　may　capture'。　Also　the



thesis；　'There　must　be　knowledge　of　what　one　knows'：　for　it　is



possible　by　this　phrase　to　mean　that　knowledge　belongs　to　both　the



knower　and　the　known。　Also；　'There　must　be　sight　of　what　one　sees：　one



sees　the　pillar：　ergo　the　pillar　has　sight'。　Also；　'What　you　profess



to…be；　that　you　profess　to…be：　you　profess　a　stone　to…be：　ergo　you



profess…to…be　a　stone'。　Also；　'Speaking　of　the　silent　is　possible'：



for　'speaking　of　the　silent'　also　has　a　double　meaning：　it　may　mean



that　the　speaker　is　silent　or　that　the　things　of　which　he　speaks　are



so。　There　are　three　varieties　of　these　ambiguities　and　amphibolies：



（1）　When　either　the　expression　or　the　name　has　strictly　more　than



one　meaning；　e。g。　aetos　and　the　'dog'；　（2）　when　by　custom　we　use



them　so；　（3）　when　words　that　have　a　simple　sense　taken　alone　have　more



than　one　meaning　in　combination；　e。g。　'knowing　letters'。　For　each



word；　both　'knowing'　and　'letters'；　possibly　has　a　single　meaning：　but



both　together　have　more　than　one…either　that　the　letters　themselves



have　knowledge　or　that　someone　else　has　it　of　them。



　　Amphiboly　and　ambiguity；　then；　depend　on　these　modes　of　speech。　Upon



the　combination　of　words　there　depend　instances　such　as　the　following：



'A　man　can　walk　while　sitting；　and　can　write　while　not　writing'。　For



the　meaning　is　not　the　same　if　one　divides　the　words　and　if　one



combines　them　in　saying　that　'it　is　possible　to　walk…while…sitting'



and　write　while　not　writing＇。　The　same　applies　to　the　latter　phrase；



too；　if　one　combines　the　words　'to　write…while…not…writing'：　for



then　it　means　that　he　has　the　power　to　write　and　not　to　write　at　once；



whereas　if　one　does　not　combine　them；　it　means　that　when　he　is　not



writing　he　has　the　power　to　write。　Also；　'He　now　if　he　has　learnt



his　letters'。　Moreover；　there　is　the　saying　that　'One　single　thing



if　you　can　carry　a　crowd　you　can　carry　too'。



　　Upon　division　depend　the　propositions　that　5　is　2　and　3；　and　odd；



and　that　the　greater　is　equal：　for　it　is　that　amount　and　more　besides。



For　the　same　phrase　would　not　be　thought　always　to　have　the　same



meaning　when　divided　and　when　combined；　e。g。　'I　made　thee　a　slave　once



a　free　man'；　and　'God…like　Achilles　left　fifty　a　hundred　men'。



　　An　argument　depending　upon　accent　it　is　not　easy　to　construct　in



unwritten　discussion；　in　written　discussions　and　in　poetry　it　is



easier。　Thus　（e。g。）　some　people　emend　Homer　against　those　who



criticize　as　unnatural　his　expression　to　men　ou　kataputhetai



ombro。　For　they　solve　the　difficulty　by　a　change　of　accent；



pronouncing　the　ou　with　an　acuter　accent。　Also；　in　the　passage



about　Agamemnon's　dream；　they　say　that　Zeus　did　not　himself　say　'We



grant　him　the　fulfilment　of　his　prayer'；　but　that　he　bade　the　dream



grant　it。　Instances　such　as　these；　then；　turn　upon　the　accentuation。



　　Others　come　about　owing　to　the　form　of　expression　used；　when　what　is



really　different　is　expressed　in　the　same　form；　e。g。　a　masculine　thing



by　a　feminine　termination；　or　a　feminine　thing　by　a　masculine；　or　a



neuter　by　either　a　masculine　or　a　feminine；　or；　again；　when　a



quality　is　expressed　by　a　termination　proper　to　quantity　or　vice



versa；　or　what　is　active　by　a　passive　word；　or　a　state　by　an　active



word；　and　so　forth　with　the　other　divisions　previously'　laid　down。　For



it　is　possible　to　use　an　expression　to　denote　what　does　not　belong



to　the　class　of　actions　at　all　as　though　it　did　so　belong。　Thus　（e。g。）



'flourishing'　is　a　word　which　in　the　form　of　its　expression　is　like



'cutting'　or　'building'：　yet　the　one　denotes　a　certain　quality…i。e。



a　certain　condition…while　the　other　denotes　a　certain　action。　In　the



same　manner　also　in　the　other　instances。



　　Refutations；　then；　that　depend　upon　language　are　drawn　from　these



common…place　rules。　Of　fallacies；　on　the　other　hand；　that　are



independent　of　language　there　are　seven　kinds：



　　（1）　that　which　depends　upon　Accident：



　　（2）　the　use　of　an　expression　absolutely　or　not　absolutely　but　with



some　qualification　of　respect　or　place；　or　time；　or　relation：



　　（3）　that　which　depends　upon　ignorance　of　what　'refutation'　is：



　　（4）　that　which　depends　upon　the　consequent：



　　（5）　that　which　depends　upon　assuming　the　original　conclusion：



　　（6）　stating　as　cause　what　is　not　the　cause：



　　（7）　the　making　of　more　than　one　question　into　one。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5







　　Fallacies；　then；　that　depend　on　Accident　occur　whenever　any



attribute　is　claimed　to　belong　in　like　manner　to　a　thing　and　to　its



accident。　For　since　the　same　thing　has　many　accidents　there　is　no



necessity　that　all　the　same　attributes　should　belong　to　all　of　a



thing's　predicates　and　to　their　subject　as　well。　Thus　（e。g。）；　'If



Coriscus　be　different　from　〃man〃；　he　is　different　from　himself：　for　he



is　a　man'：　or　'If　he　be　different　from　Socrates；　and　Socrates　be　a



man；　then'；　they　say；　'he　has　admitted　that　Coriscus　is　different　from



a　man；　because　it　so　happens　（accidit）　that　the　person　from　whom　he



said　that　he　（Coriscus）　is　different　is　a　man'。



　　Those　that　depend　on　whether　an　expression　is　used　absolutely　or



in　a　certain　respect　and　not　strictly；　occur　whenever　an　expression



used　in　a　particular　sense　is　taken　as　though　it　were　used　absolutely；



e。g。　in　the　argument　'If　what　is　not　is　the　object　of　an　opinion；　then



what　is　not　is'：　for　it　is　not　the　same　thing　'to　be　x'　and　'to　be'



absolutely。　Or　again；　'What　is；　is　not；　if　it　is　not　a　particular　kind



of　being；　e。g。　if　it　is　not　a　man。'　For　i