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on sophistical refutations-第17部分

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place and time。 For all arguments of the following kind depend upon



this。' Is health; or wealth; a good thing?' 'Yes。' 'But to the fool



who does not use it aright it is not a good thing: therefore it is



both good and not good。' 'Is health; or political power; a good



thing?' 'Yes。 〃But sometimes it is not particularly good: therefore



the same thing is both good and not good to the same man。' Or rather



there is nothing to prevent a thing; though good absolutely; being not



good to a particular man; or being good to a particular man; and yet



not good or here。 'Is that which the prudent man would not wish; an



evil?' 'Yes。' 'But to get rid of; he would not wish the good:



therefore the good is an evil。' But that is a mistake; for it is not



the same thing to say 'The good is an evil' and 'to get rid of the



good is an evil'。 Likewise also the argument of the thief is mistaken。



For it is not the case that if the thief is an evil thing; acquiring



things is also evil: what he wishes; therefore; is not what is evil



but what is good; for to acquire something good is good。 Also; disease



is an evil thing; but not to get rid of disease。 'Is the just



preferable to the unjust; and what takes place justly to what takes



place unjustly? 'Yes。' 'But to to be put to death unjustly is



preferable。' 'Is it just that each should have his own?' 'Yes。' 'But



whatever decisions a man comes to on the strength of his personal



opinion; even if it be a false opinion; are valid in law: therefore



the same result is both just and unjust。' Also; should one decide in



favour of him who says what is unjust?' 'The former。' 'But you see; it



is just for the injured party to say fully the things he has suffered;



and these are fallacies。 For because to suffer a thing unjustly is



preferable; unjust ways are not therefore preferable; though in this



particular case the unjust may very well be better than the just。



Also; to have one's own is just; while to have what is another's is



not just: all the same; the decision in question may very well be a



just decision; whatever it be that the opinion of the man who gave the



decision supports: for because it is just in this particular case or



in this particular manner; it is not also just absolutely。 Likewise



also; though things are unjust; there is nothing to prevent the



speaking of them being just: for because to speak of things is just;



there is no necessity that the things should be just; any more than



because to speak of things be of use; the things need be of use。



Likewise also in the case of what is just。 So that it is not the



case that because the things spoken of are unjust; the victory goes to



him who speaks unjust things: for he speaks of things that are just to



speak of; though absolutely; i。e。 to suffer; they are unjust。







                                26







  Refutations that depend on the definition of a refutation must;



according to the plan sketched above; be met by comparing together the



conclusion with its contradictory; and seeing that it shall involve



the same attribute in the same respect and relation and manner and



time。 If this additional question be put at the start; you should



not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both double



and not double; but grant that it is possible; only not in such a



way as was agreed to constitute a refutation of your case。 All the



following arguments depend upon a point of that kind。 'Does a man



who knows A to be A; know the thing called A?' and in the same way;



'is one who is ignorant that A is A ignorant of the thing called A?'



'Yes。' 'But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus might be



ignorant of the fact that he is musical; so that he both knows and



is ignorant of the same thing。' Is a thing four cubits long greater



than a thing three cubits long?' 'Yes。' 'But a thing might grow from



three to four cubits in length; 'now what is 'greater' is greater than



a 'less': accordingly the thing in question will be both greater and



less than itself in the same respect。







                                27







  As to refutations that depend on begging and assuming the original



point to be proved; suppose the nature of the question to be



obvious; one should not grant it; even though it be a view generally



held; but should tell him the truth。 Suppose; however; that it escapes



one; then; thanks to the badness of arguments of that kind; one should



make one's error recoil upon the questioner; and say that he has



brought no argument: for a refutation must be proved independently



of the original point。 Secondly; one should say that the point was



granted under the impression that he intended not to use it as a



premiss; but to reason against it; in the opposite way from that



adopted in refutations on side issues。







                                28







  Also; those refutations that bring one to their conclusion through



the consequent you should show up in the course of the argument



itself。 The mode in which consequences follow is twofold。 For the



argument either is that as the universal follows on its



particular…as (e。g。) 'animal' follows from 'man'…so does the



particular on its universal: for the claim is made that if A is always



found with B; then B also is always found with A。 Or else it



proceeds by way of the opposites of the terms involved: for if A



follows B; it is claimed that A's opposite will follow B's opposite。



On this latter claim the argument of Melissus also depends: for he



claims that because that which has come to be has a beginning; that



which has not come to be has none; so that if the heaven has not



come to be; it is also eternal。 But that is not so; for the sequence



is vice versa。







                                29







  In the case of any refutations whose reasoning depends on some



addition; look and see if upon its subtraction the absurdity follows



none the less: and then if so; the answerer should point this out; and



say that he granted the addition not because he really thought it; but



for the sake of the argument; whereas the questioner has not used it



for the purpose of his argument at all。







                                30







  To meet those refutations which make several questions into one; one



should draw a distinction between them straight away at the start。 For



a question must be single to which there is a single answer; so that



one must not affirm or deny several things of one thing; nor one thing



of many; but one of one。 But just as in the case of ambiguous terms;



an attribute belongs to a term sometimes in both its senses; and



sometimes in neither; so that a simple answer does one; as it happens;



no harm despite the fact that the question is not simple; so it is



in these cases of double questions too。
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