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on sophistical refutations-第15部分

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possible to have what one has not received; e。g。 to have received



sweet wine; but then; owing to its going bad in the course of receipt;



to have it sour。 But; as was said also above;' all these persons



direct their solutions against the man; not against his argument。



For if this were a genuine solution; then; suppose any one to grant



the opposite; he could find no solution; just as happens in other



cases; e。g。 suppose the true solution to be 'So…and…so is partly



true and partly not'; then; if the answerer grants the expression



without any qualification; the sophist's conclusion follows。 If; on



the other hand; the conclusion does not follow; then that could not be



the true solution: and what we say in regard to the foregoing examples



is that; even if all the sophist's premisses be granted; still no



proof is effected。



  Moreover; the following too belong to this group of arguments。 'If



something be in writing did some one write it?' 'Yes。' 'But it is



now in writing that you are seated…a false statement; though it was



true at the time when it was written: therefore the statement that was



written is at the same time false and true。' But this is fallacious;



for the falsity or truth of a statement or opinion indicates not a



substance but a quality: for the same account applies to the case of



an opinion as well。 Again; 'Is what a learner learns what he



learns?' 'Yes。' 'But suppose some one learns 〃slow〃 quick'。 Then his



(the sophist's) words denote not what the learner learns but how he



learns it。 Also; 'Does a man tread upon what he walks through?



'Yes。' 'But X walks through a whole day。' No; rather the words



denote not what he walks through; but when he walks; just as when



any one uses the words 'to drink the cup' he denotes not what he



drinks; but the vessel out of which he drinks。 Also; 'Is it either



by learning or by discovery that a man knows what he knows?' 'Yes。'



'But suppose that of a pair of things he has discovered one and



learned the other; the pair is not known to him by either method。' No:



'what' he knows; means' every single thing' he knows; individually;



but this does not mean 'all the things' he knows; collectively。 Again;



there is the proof that there is a 'third man' distinct from Man and



from individual men。 But that is a fallacy; for 'Man'; and indeed





every general predicate; denotes not an individual substance; but a



particular quality; or the being related to something in a



particular manner; or something of that sort。 Likewise also in the



case of 'Coriscus' and 'Coriscus the musician' there is the problem;



Are they the same or different?' For the one denotes an individual



substance and the other a quality; so that it cannot be isolated;



though it is not the isolation which creates the 'third man'; but



the admission that it is an individual substance。 For 'Man' cannot



be an individual substance; as Callias is。 Nor is the case improved



one whit even if one were to call the clement he has isolated not an



individual substance but a quality: for there will still be the one



beside the many; just as 'Man' was。 It is evident then that one must



not grant that what is a common predicate applying to a class



universally is an individual substance; but must say that denotes



either a quality; or a relation; or a quantity; or something of that



kind。







                                23







  It is a general rule in dealing with arguments that depend on



language that the solution always follows the opposite of the point on



which the argument turns: e。g。 if the argument depends upon



combination; then the solution consists in division; if upon division;



then in combination。 Again; if it depends on an acute accent; the



solution is a grave accent; if on a grave accent; it is an acute。 If



it depends on ambiguity; one can solve it by using the opposite



term; e。g。 if you find yourself calling something inanimate; despite



your previous denial that it was so; show in what sense it is alive:



if; on the other hand; one has declared it to be inanimate and the



sophist has proved it to be animate; say how it is inanimate。 Likewise



also in a case of amphiboly。 If the argument depends on likeness of



expression; the opposite will be the solution。 'Could a man give



what he has not got? 'No; not what he has not got; but he could give



it in a way in which he has not got it; e。g。 one die by itself。'



Does a man know either by learning or by discovery each thing that



he knows; singly? but not the things that he knows; collectively。'



Also a man treads; perhaps; on any thing he walks through; but not



on the time he walks through。 Likewise also in the case of the other



examples。







                                24







  In dealing with arguments that depend on Accident; one and the



same solution meets all cases。 For since it is indeterminate when an



attribute should be ascribed to a thing; in cases where it belongs



to the accident of the thing; and since in some cases it is



generally agreed and people admit that it belongs; while in others



they deny that it need belong; we should therefore; as soon as the



conclusion has been drawn; say in answer to them all alike; that there



is no need for such an attribute to belong。 One must; however; be



prepared to adduce an example of the kind of attribute meant。 All



arguments such as the following depend upon Accident。 'Do you know



what I am going to ask you? you know the man who is approaching'; or



'the man in the mask'? 'Is the statue your work of art?' or 'Is the



dog your father?' 'Is the product of a small number with a small



number a small number?' For it is evident in all these cases that



there is no necessity for the attribute which is true of the thing's



accident to be true of the thing as well。 For only to things that



are indistinguishable and one in essence is it generally agreed that



all the same attributes belong; whereas in the case of a good thing;



to be good is not the same as to be going to be the subject of a



question; nor in the case of a man approaching; or wearing a mask;



is 'to be approaching' the same thing as 'to be Coriscus'; so that



suppose I know Coriscus; but do not know the man who is approaching;



it still isn't the case that I both know and do not know the same man;



nor; again; if this is mine and is also a work of art; is it therefore



my work of art; but my property or thing or something else。 (The



solution is after the same manner in the other cases as well。)



  Some solve these refutations by demolishing the original proposition



asked: for they say that it is possible to know and not to know the



same thing; only not in the same respect: accordingly; when they don't



know the man who is coming towards them; but do know Corsicus; they



assert that they do know and do
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