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on sophistical refutations-第14部分

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are good things to learn; aren't they?' 'Yes。' 'The knowledge;



however; of evil is good: therefore evil is a good thing to know。'



'Yes。 But; you see; evil is both evil and a thing…to…learn; so that



evil is an evil…thing…to…learn; although the knowledge of evils is



good。' Again; 'Is it true to say in the present moment that you are



born?' 'Yes。' 'Then you are born in the present moment。' 'No; the



expression as divided has a different meaning: for it is true to



say…in…the…present…moment that 〃you are born〃; but not 〃You are



born…in…the…present…moment〃。' Again; 'Could you do what you can; and



as you can?' 'Yes。' 'But when not harping; you have the power to harp:



and therefore you could harp when not harping。' 'No: he has not the



power to harp…while…not…harping; merely; when he is not doing it; he



has the power to do it。' Some people solve this last refutation in



another way as well。 For; they say; if he has granted that he can do



anything in the way he can; still it does not follow that he can



harp when not harping: for it has not been granted that he will do



anything in every way in which he can; and it is not the same thing'



to do a thing in the way he can' and 'to do it in every way in which



he can'。 But evidently they do not solve it properly: for of arguments



that depend upon the same point the solution is the same; whereas this



will not fit all cases of the kind nor yet all ways of putting the



questions: it is valid against the questioner; but not against his



argument。







                                21







  Accentuation gives rise to no fallacious arguments; either as



written or as spoken; except perhaps some few that might be made up;



e。g。 the following argument。 'Is ou katalueis a house?' 'Yes。' 'Is



then ou katalueis the negation of katalueis?' 'Yes。' 'But you



said that ou katalueis is a house: therefore the house is a



negation。' How one should solve this; is clear: for the word does



not mean the same when spoken with an acuter and when spoken with a



graver accent。







                                22







  It is clear also how one must meet those fallacies that depend on



the identical expressions of things that are not identical; seeing



that we are in possession of the kinds of predications。 For the one



man; say; has granted; when asked; that a term denoting a substance



does not belong as an attribute; while the other has shown that some



attribute belongs which is in the Category of Relation or of Quantity;



but is usually thought to denote a substance because of its



expression; e。g。 in the following argument: 'Is it possible to be



doing and to have done the same thing at the same time?' 'No。' 'But;



you see; it is surely possible to be seeing and to have seen the



same thing at the same time; and in the same aspect。' Again; 'Is any



mode of passivity a mode of activity?' 'No。' 'Then 〃he is cut〃; 〃he is



burnt〃; 〃he is struck by some sensible object〃 are alike in expression



and all denote some form of passivity; while again 〃to say〃; 〃to run〃;



〃to see〃 are like one like one another in expression: but; you see;



〃to see〃 is surely a form of being struck by a sensible object;



therefore it is at the same time a form of passivity and of activity。'



Suppose; however; that in that case any one; after granting that it is



not possible to do and to have done the same thing in the same time;



were to say that it is possible to see and to have seen it; still he



has not yet been refuted; suppose him to say that 'to see' is not a



form of 'doing' (activity) but of 'passivity': for this question is



required as well; though he is supposed by the listener to have



already granted it; when he granted that 'to cut' is a form of



present; and 'to have cut' a form of past; activity; and so on with



the other things that have a like expression。 For the listener adds



the rest by himself; thinking the meaning to be alike: whereas



really the meaning is not alike; though it appears to be so because of



the expression。 The same thing happens here as happens in cases of



ambiguity: for in dealing with ambiguous expressions the tyro in



argument supposes the sophist to have negated the fact which he (the



tyro) affirmed; and not merely the name: whereas there still wants the



question whether in using the ambiguous term he had a single meaning



in view: for if he grants that that was so; the refutation will be



effected。



  Like the above are also the following arguments。 It is asked if a



man has lost what he once had and afterwards has not: for a man will



no longer have ten dice even though he has only lost one die。 No:



rather it is that he has lost what he had before and has not now;



but there is no necessity for him to have lost as much or as many



things as he has not now。 So then; he asks the questions as to what he



has; and draws the conclusion as to the whole number that he has:



for ten is a number。 If then he had asked to begin with; whether a man



no longer having the number of things he once had has lost the whole



number; no one would have granted it; but would have said 'Either



the whole number or one of them'。 Also there is the argument that 'a



man may give what he has not got': for he has not got only one die。



No: rather it is that he has given not what he had not got; but in a



manner in which he had not got it; viz。 just the one。 For the word



'only' does not signify a particular substance or quality or number;



but a manner relation; e。g。 that it is not coupled with any other。



It is therefore just as if he had asked 'Could a man give what he



has not got?' and; on being given the answer 'No'; were to ask if a



man could give a thing quickly when he had not got it quickly; and; on



this being granted; were to conclude that 'a man could give what he



had not got'。 It is quite evident that he has not proved his point:



for to 'give quickly' is not to give a thing; but to give in a certain



manner; and a man could certainly give a thing in a manner in which he



has not got it; e。g。 he might have got it with pleasure and give it



with pain。



  Like these are also all arguments of the following kind: 'Could a



man strike a blow with a hand which he has not got; or see with an eye



which he has not got?' For he has not got only one eye。 Some people



solve this case; where a man has more than one eye; or more than one



of anything else; by saying also that he has only one。 Others also



solve it as they solve the refutation of the view that 'what a man



has; he has received': for A gave only one vote; and certainly B; they



say; has only one vote from A。 Others; again; proceed by demolishing



straight away the proposition asked; and admitting that it is quite



possible to have what one has not received; e。g。 to have received



sweet wine; but then; owing to its goin
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