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on sophistical refutations-第13部分

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the premiss proposed is usually meant…whether as maxims are (for



people call by the name of 'maxims' both true opinions and general



assertions) or like the doctrine 'the diagonal of a square is



incommensurate with its side': and moreover (2) whenever opinions



are divided as to the truth; we then have subjects of which it is very



easy to change the terminology undetected。 For because of the



uncertainty in which of the two senses the premiss contains the truth;



one will not be thought to be playing any trick; while because of



the division of opinion; one will not be thought to be telling a



falsehood。 Change the terminology therefore; for the change will



make the position irrefutable。



  Moreover; whenever one foresees any question coming; one should



put in one's objection and have one's say beforehand: for by doing



so one is likely to embarrass the questioner most effectually。







                                18







  Inasmuch as a proper solution is an exposure of false reasoning;



showing on what kind of question the falsity depends; and whereas



'false reasoning' has a double meaning…for it is used either if a



false conclusion has been proved; or if there is only an apparent



proof and no real one…there must be both the kind of solution just



described;' and also the correction of a merely apparent proof; so



as to show upon which of the questions the appearance depends。 Thus it



comes about that one solves arguments that are properly reasoned by



demolishing them; whereas one solves merely apparent arguments by



drawing distinctions。 Again; inasmuch as of arguments that are



properly reasoned some have a true and others a false conclusion;



those that are false in respect of their conclusion it is possible



to solve in two ways; for it is possible both by demolishing one of



the premisses asked; and by showing that the conclusion is not the



real state of the case: those; on the other hand; that are false in



respect of the premisses can be solved only by a demolition of one



of them; for the conclusion is true。 So that those who wish to solve



an argument should in the first place look and see if it is properly



reasoned; or is unreasoned; and next; whether the conclusion be true



or false; in order that we may effect the solution either by drawing



some distinction or by demolishing something; and demolishing it



either in this way or in that; as was laid down before。 There is a



very great deal of difference between solving an argument when being



subjected to questions and when not: for to foresee traps is



difficult; whereas to see them at one's leisure is easier。







                                19







  Of the refutations; then; that depend upon ambiguity and amphiboly



some contain some question with more than one meaning; while others



contain a conclusion bearing a number of senses: e。g。 in the proof



that 'speaking of the silent' is possible; the conclusion has a double



meaning; while in the proof that 'he who knows does not understand



what he knows' one of the questions contains an amphiboly。 Also the



double…edged saying is true in one context but not in another: it



means something that is and something that is not。



  Whenever; then; the many senses lie in the conclusion no



refutation takes place unless the sophist secures as well the



contradiction of the conclusion he means to prove; e。g。 in the proof



that 'seeing of the blind' is possible: for without the



contradiction there was no refutation。 Whenever; on the other hand;



the many senses lie in the questions; there is no necessity to begin



by denying the double…edged premiss: for this was not the goal of



the argument but only its support。 At the start; then; one should



reply with regard to an ambiguity; whether of a term or of a phrase;



in this manner; that 'in one sense it is so; and in another not so';



as e。g。 that 'speaking of the silent' is in one sense possible but



in another not possible: also that in one sense 'one should do what



must needs be done'; but not in another: for 'what must needs be'



bears a number of senses。 If; however; the ambiguity escapes one;



one should correct it at the end by making an addition to the



question: 'Is speaking of the silent possible?' 'No; but to speak of



while he is silent is possible。' Also; in cases which contain the



ambiguity in their premisses; one should reply in like manner: 'Do



people…then not understand what they know? 〃Yes; but not those who



know it in the manner described': for it is not the same thing to



say that 'those who know cannot understand what they know'; and to say



that 'those who know something in this particular manner cannot do



so'。 In general; too; even though he draws his conclusion in a quite



unambiguous manner; one should contend that what he has negated is not



the fact which one has asserted but only its name; and that



therefore there is no refutation。







                                20







  It is evident also how one should solve those refutations that



depend upon the division and combination of words: for if the



expression means something different when divided and when combined;



as soon as one's opponent draws his conclusion one should take the



expression in the contrary way。 All such expressions as the



following depend upon the combination or division of the words: 'Was X



being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten?' and



'Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being



beaten?' This fallacy has also in it an element of amphiboly in the



questions; but it really depends upon combination。 For the meaning



that depends upon the division of the words is not really a double



meaning (for the expression when divided is not the same); unless also



the word that is pronounced; according to its breathing; as eros and



eros is a case of double meaning。 (In writing; indeed; a word is the



same whenever it is written of the same letters and in the same



manner… and even there people nowadays put marks at the side to



show the pronunciation… but the spoken words are not the same。)



Accordingly an expression that depends upon division is not an



ambiguous one。 It is evident also that not all refutations depend upon



ambiguity as some people say they do。



  The answerer; then; must divide the expression: for



'I…saw…a…man…being…beaten with my eyes' is not the same as to say 'I



saw a man being…beaten…with…my…eyes'。 Also there is the argument of



Euthydemus proving 'Then you know now in Sicily that there are



triremes in Piraeus': and again; 'Can a good man who is a cobbler be



bad?' 'No。' 'But a good man may be a bad cobbler: therefore a good



cobbler will be bad。' Again; 'Things the knowledge of which is good;



are good things to learn; aren't they?' 'Yes。' 'The knowledge;



however; of ev
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