on sophistical refutations-第12部分

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Coriscus　unmusical。　But　this　will　not　do；　for　to　say　'this　Coriscus　is



unmusical'；　or　'musical'；　and　to　say　'this　Coriscus'　is　so；　is　to



use　the　same　expression：　and　this　he　is　both　affirming　and　denying



at　once。　'But　perhaps　they　do　not　mean　the　same。'　Well；　nor　did　the



simple　name　in　the　former　case：　so　where　is　the　difference？　If；



however；　he　is　to　ascribe　to　the　one　person　the　simple　title



'Coriscus'；　while　to　the　other　he　is　to　add　the　prefix　'one'　or



'this'；　he　commits　an　absurdity：　for　the　latter　is　no　more



applicable　to　the　one　than　to　the　other：　for　to　whichever　he　adds



it；　it　makes　no　difference。



　　All　the　same；　since　if　a　man　does　not　distinguish　the　senses　of　an



amphiboly；　it　is　not　clear　whether　he　has　been　confuted　or　has　not



been　confuted；　and　since　in　arguments　the　right　to　distinguish　them　is



granted；　it　is　evident　that　to　grant　the　question　simply　without



drawing　any　distinction　is　a　mistake；　so　that；　even　if　not　the　man



himself；　at　any　rate　his　argument　looks　as　though　it　had　been　refuted。



It　often　happens；　however；　that；　though　they　see　the　amphiboly；　people



hesitate　to　draw　such　distinctions；　because　of　the　dense　crowd　of



persons　who　propose　questions　of　the　kind；　in　order　that　they　may



not　be　thought　to　be　obstructionists　at　every　turn：　then；　though



they　would　never　have　supposed　that　that　was　the　point　on　which　the



argument　turned；　they　often　find　themselves　faced　by　a　paradox。



Accordingly；　since　the　right　of　drawing　the　distinction　is　granted；



one　should　not　hesitate；　as　has　been　said　before。



　　If　people　never　made　two　questions　into　one　question；　the　fallacy



that　turns　upon　ambiguity　and　amphiboly　would　not　have　existed　either；



but　either　genuine　refutation　or　none。　For　what　is　the　difference



between　asking　'Are　Callias　and　Themistocles　musical？'　and　what　one



might　have　asked　if　they；　being　different；　had　had　one　name？　For　if



the　term　applied　means　more　than　one　thing；　he　has　asked　more　than　one



question。　If　then　it　be　not　right　to　demand　simply　to　be　given　a



single　answer　to　two　questions；　it　is　evident　that　it　is　not　proper　to



give　a　simple　answer　to　any　ambiguous　question；　not　even　if　the



predicate　be　true　of　all　the　subjects；　as　some　claim　that　one



should。　For　this　is　exactly　as　though　he　had　asked　'Are　Coriscus　and



Callias　at　home　or　not　at　home？'；　supposing　them　to　be　both　in　or　both



out：　for　in　both　cases　there　is　a　number　of　propositions：　for　though



the　simple　answer　be　true；　that　does　not　make　the　question　one。　For　it



is　possible　for　it　to　be　true　to　answer　even　countless　different



questions　when　put　to　one；　all　together　with　either　a　'Yes'　or　a　'No'：



but　still　one　should　not　answer　them　with　a　single　answer：　for　that　is



the　death　of　discussion。　Rather；　the　case　is　like　as　though



different　things　has　actually　had　the　same　name　applied　to　them。　If



then；　one　should　not　give　a　single　answer　to　two　questions；　it　is



evident　that　we　should　not　say　simply　'Yes'　or　'No'　in　the　case　of



ambiguous　terms　either：　for　the　remark　is　simply　a　remark；　not　an



answer　at　all；　although　among　disputants　such　remarks　are　loosely



deemed　to　be　answers；　because　they　do　not　see　what　the　consequence　is。



　　As　we　said；　then；　inasmuch　as　certain　refutations　are　generally



taken　for　such；　though　not　such　really；　in　the　same　way　also　certain



solutions　will　be　generally　taken　for　solutions；　though　not　really



such。　Now　these；　we　say；　must　sometimes　be　advanced　rather　than　the



true　solutions　in　contentious　reasonings　and　in　the　encounter　with



ambiguity。　The　proper　answer　in　saying　what　one　thinks　is　to　say



'Granted'；　for　in　that　way　the　likelihood　of　being　refuted　on　a　side



issue　is　minimized。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　one　is　compelled　to　say



something　paradoxical；　one　should　then　be　most　careful　to　add　that　'it



seems'　so：　for　in　that　way　one　avoids　the　impression　of　being　either



refuted　or　paradoxical。　Since　it　is　clear　what　is　meant　by　'begging



the　original　question'；　and　people　think　that　they　must　at　all　costs



overthrow　the　premisses　that　lie　near　the　conclusion；　and　plead　in



excuse　for　refusing　to　grant　him　some　of　them　that　he　is　begging　the



original　question；　so　whenever　any　one　claims　from　us　a　point　such



as　is　bound　to　follow　as　a　consequence　from　our　thesis；　but　is　false



or　paradoxical；　we　must　plead　the　same：　for　the　necessary　consequences



are　generally　held　to　be　a　part　of　the　thesis　itself。　Moreover；



whenever　the　universal　has　been　secured　not　under　a　definite　name；　but



by　a　comparison　of　instances；　one　should　say　that　the　questioner



assumes　it　not　in　the　sense　in　which　it　was　granted　nor　in　which　he



proposed　it　in　the　premiss：　for　this　too　is　a　point　upon　which　a



refutation　often　depends。



　　If　one　is　debarred　from　these　defences　one　must　pass　to　the　argument



that　the　conclusion　has　not　been　properly　shown；　approaching　it　in　the



light　of　the　aforesaid　distinction　between　the　different　kinds　of



fallacy。



　　In　the　case；　then；　of　names　that　are　used　literally　one　is　bound



to　answer　either　simply　or　by　drawing　a　distinction：　the　tacit



understandings　implied　in　our　statements；　e。g。　in　answer　to



questions　that　are　not　put　clearly　but　elliptically…it　is　upon　this



that　the　consequent　refutation　depends。　For　example；　'Is　what



belongs　to　Athenians　the　property　of　Athenians？'　Yes。　'And　so　it　is



likewise　in　other　cases。　But　observe；　man　belongs　to　the　animal



kingdom；　doesn't　he？'　Yes。　'Then　man　is　the　property　of　the　animal



kingdom。'　But　this　is　a　fallacy：　for　we　say　that　man　'belongs　to'



the　animal　kingdom　because　he　is　an　animal；　just　as　we　say　that



Lysander　'belongs　to'　the　Spartans；　because　he　is　a　Spartan。　It　is



evident；　then；　that　where　the　premiss　put　forward　is　not　clear；　one



must　not　grant　it　simply。



　　Whenever　of　two　things　it　is　generally　thought　that　if　the　one　is



true　the　other　is　true　of　necessity；　whereas；　if　the　other　is　true；



the　first　is　not　true　of　necessity；　one　should；　if　asked　which　of　them



is　true；　grant　the　smaller　one：　for　the　larger　the　number　of



premisses；　the　harder　it　is　to　draw　a　conclusion　from　them。　If；　again；



the　sophist　tries　to　secure　that　has　a　contrary　while　B　has　not；



suppose　what　he　says　is　true；　you　should　say　that　each　has　a　contrary；



only　for　the　one　there　is　no　established　name。



　　Since；　again；　in　regard　to　some　of　the　views　they　express；　most



people　would　say　that　any　one　who　did　not　admit　them　was　telling　a



falsehood；　while　they　would　not　say　this　in　regard　to　some；　e。g。　to



any　matters　whereon　opinion　is　divided　（for　most　people　have　no



distinct　view　whether　the　soul　of　animals　is　destructible　or



immortal）；　accordingly　（1）　it　is　uncertain　in　which　of　two　senses



the　premiss　proposed　is　usually　meant…whether　as　maxims　are　（for



people　call　by　the　name　of　'maxims'　both　true　opinions　and　g