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on sophistical refutations-第11部分

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answerer's position either with his own statements; or with those of



persons whom he admits to say and do aright; moreover with those of



people who are generally supposed to bear that kind of character; or



who are like them; or with those of the majority or of all men。 Also



just as answerers; too; often; when they are in process of being



confuted; draw a distinction; if their confutation is just about to



take place; so questioners also should resort to this from time to



time to counter objectors; pointing out; supposing that against one



sense of the words the objection holds; but not against the other;



that they have taken it in the latter sense; as e。g。 Cleophon does



in the Mandrobulus。 They should also break off their argument and



cut down their other lines of attack; while in answering; if a man



perceives this being done beforehand; he should put in his objection



and have his say first。 One should also lead attacks sometimes against



positions other than the one stated; on the understood condition



that one cannot find lines of attack against the view laid down; as



Lycophron did when ordered to deliver a eulogy upon the lyre。 To



counter those who demand 'Against what are you directing your



effort?'; since one is generally thought bound to state the charge



made; while; on the other hand; some ways of stating it make the



defence too easy; you should state as your aim only the general result



that always happens in refutations; namely the contradiction of his



thesis …viz。 that your effort is to deny what he has affirmed; or to



affirm what he denied: don't say that you are trying to show that



the knowledge of contraries is; or is not; the same。 One must not



ask one's conclusion in the form of a premiss; while some



conclusions should not even be put as questions at all; one should



take and use it as granted。







                                16







  We have now therefore dealt with the sources of questions; and the



methods of questioning in contentious disputations: next we have to



speak of answering; and of how solutions should be made; and of what



requires them; and of what use is served by arguments of this kind。



  The use of them; then; is; for philosophy; twofold。 For in the first



place; since for the most part they depend upon the expression; they



put us in a better condition for seeing in how many senses any term is



used; and what kind of resemblances and what kind of differences occur



between things and between their names。 In the second place they are



useful for one's own personal researches; for the man who is easily



committed to a fallacy by some one else; and does not perceive it;



is likely to incur this fate of himself also on many occasions。



Thirdly and lastly; they further contribute to one's reputation;



viz。 the reputation of being well trained in everything; and not



inexperienced in anything: for that a party to arguments should find



fault with them; if he cannot definitely point out their weakness;



creates a suspicion; making it seem as though it were not the truth of



the matter but merely inexperience that put him out of temper。



  Answerers may clearly see how to meet arguments of this kind; if our



previous account was right of the sources whence fallacies came; and



also our distinctions adequate of the forms of dishonesty in putting



questions。 But it is not the same thing take an argument in one's hand



and then to see and solve its faults; as it is to be able to meet it



quickly while being subjected to questions: for what we know; we often



do not know in a different context。 Moreover; just as in other



things speed is enhanced by training; so it is with arguments too;



so that supposing we are unpractised; even though a point be clear



to us; we are often too late for the right moment。 Sometimes too it



happens as with diagrams; for there we can sometimes analyse the



figure; but not construct it again: so too in refutations; though we



know the thing on which the connexion of the argument depends; we



still are at a loss to split the argument apart。







                                17







  First then; just as we say that we ought sometimes to choose to



prove something in the general estimation rather than in truth; so



also we have sometimes to solve arguments rather in the general



estimation than according to the truth。 For it is a general rule in



fighting contentious persons; to treat them not as refuting; but as



merely appearing to refute: for we say that they don't really prove



their case; so that our object in correcting them must be to dispel



the appearance of it。 For if refutation be an unambiguous



contradiction arrived at from certain views; there could be no need to



draw distinctions against amphiboly and ambiguity: they do not



effect a proof。 The only motive for drawing further distinctions is



that the conclusion reached looks like a refutation。 What; then; we



have to beware of; is not being refuted; but seeming to be; because of



course the asking of amphibolies and of questions that turn upon



ambiguity; and all the other tricks of that kind; conceal even a



genuine refutation; and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is



not。 For since one has the right at the end; when the conclusion is



drawn; to say that the only denial made of One's statement is



ambiguous; no matter how precisely he may have addressed his



argument to the very same point as oneself; it is not clear whether



one has been refuted: for it is not clear whether at the moment one is



speaking the truth。 If; on the other hand; one had drawn a



distinction; and questioned him on the ambiguous term or the



amphiboly; the refutation would not have been a matter of uncertainty。



Also what is incidentally the object of contentious arguers; though



less so nowadays than formerly; would have been fulfilled; namely that



the person questioned should answer either 'Yes' or 'No': whereas



nowadays the improper forms in which questioners put their questions



compel the party questioned to add something to his answer in



correction of the faultiness of the proposition as put: for certainly;



if the questioner distinguishes his meaning adequately; the answerer



is bound to reply either 'Yes' or 'No'。



  If any one is going to suppose that an argument which turns upon



ambiguity is a refutation; it will be impossible for an answerer to



escape being refuted in a sense: for in the case of visible objects



one is bound of necessity to deny the term one has asserted; and to



assert what one has denied。 For the remedy which some people have



for this is quite unavailing。 They say; not that Coriscus is both



musical and unmusical; but that this Coriscus is musical and this



Coriscus unmusical。 But this will not do; for to say 'this Coriscus is



unmusical'; or 'musical';
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