on sophistical refutations-第11部分

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answerer's　position　either　with　his　own　statements；　or　with　those　of



persons　whom　he　admits　to　say　and　do　aright；　moreover　with　those　of



people　who　are　generally　supposed　to　bear　that　kind　of　character；　or



who　are　like　them；　or　with　those　of　the　majority　or　of　all　men。　Also



just　as　answerers；　too；　often；　when　they　are　in　process　of　being



confuted；　draw　a　distinction；　if　their　confutation　is　just　about　to



take　place；　so　questioners　also　should　resort　to　this　from　time　to



time　to　counter　objectors；　pointing　out；　supposing　that　against　one



sense　of　the　words　the　objection　holds；　but　not　against　the　other；



that　they　have　taken　it　in　the　latter　sense；　as　e。g。　Cleophon　does



in　the　Mandrobulus。　They　should　also　break　off　their　argument　and



cut　down　their　other　lines　of　attack；　while　in　answering；　if　a　man



perceives　this　being　done　beforehand；　he　should　put　in　his　objection



and　have　his　say　first。　One　should　also　lead　attacks　sometimes　against



positions　other　than　the　one　stated；　on　the　understood　condition



that　one　cannot　find　lines　of　attack　against　the　view　laid　down；　as



Lycophron　did　when　ordered　to　deliver　a　eulogy　upon　the　lyre。　To



counter　those　who　demand　'Against　what　are　you　directing　your



effort？'；　since　one　is　generally　thought　bound　to　state　the　charge



made；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　some　ways　of　stating　it　make　the



defence　too　easy；　you　should　state　as　your　aim　only　the　general　result



that　always　happens　in　refutations；　namely　the　contradiction　of　his



thesis　…viz。　that　your　effort　is　to　deny　what　he　has　affirmed；　or　to



affirm　what　he　denied：　don't　say　that　you　are　trying　to　show　that



the　knowledge　of　contraries　is；　or　is　not；　the　same。　One　must　not



ask　one's　conclusion　in　the　form　of　a　premiss；　while　some



conclusions　should　not　even　be　put　as　questions　at　all；　one　should



take　and　use　it　as　granted。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　16







　　We　have　now　therefore　dealt　with　the　sources　of　questions；　and　the



methods　of　questioning　in　contentious　disputations：　next　we　have　to



speak　of　answering；　and　of　how　solutions　should　be　made；　and　of　what



requires　them；　and　of　what　use　is　served　by　arguments　of　this　kind。



　　The　use　of　them；　then；　is；　for　philosophy；　twofold。　For　in　the　first



place；　since　for　the　most　part　they　depend　upon　the　expression；　they



put　us　in　a　better　condition　for　seeing　in　how　many　senses　any　term　is



used；　and　what　kind　of　resemblances　and　what　kind　of　differences　occur



between　things　and　between　their　names。　In　the　second　place　they　are



useful　for　one's　own　personal　researches；　for　the　man　who　is　easily



committed　to　a　fallacy　by　some　one　else；　and　does　not　perceive　it；



is　likely　to　incur　this　fate　of　himself　also　on　many　occasions。



Thirdly　and　lastly；　they　further　contribute　to　one's　reputation；



viz。　the　reputation　of　being　well　trained　in　everything；　and　not



inexperienced　in　anything：　for　that　a　party　to　arguments　should　find



fault　with　them；　if　he　cannot　definitely　point　out　their　weakness；



creates　a　suspicion；　making　it　seem　as　though　it　were　not　the　truth　of



the　matter　but　merely　inexperience　that　put　him　out　of　temper。



　　Answerers　may　clearly　see　how　to　meet　arguments　of　this　kind；　if　our



previous　account　was　right　of　the　sources　whence　fallacies　came；　and



also　our　distinctions　adequate　of　the　forms　of　dishonesty　in　putting



questions。　But　it　is　not　the　same　thing　take　an　argument　in　one's　hand



and　then　to　see　and　solve　its　faults；　as　it　is　to　be　able　to　meet　it



quickly　while　being　subjected　to　questions：　for　what　we　know；　we　often



do　not　know　in　a　different　context。　Moreover；　just　as　in　other



things　speed　is　enhanced　by　training；　so　it　is　with　arguments　too；



so　that　supposing　we　are　unpractised；　even　though　a　point　be　clear



to　us；　we　are　often　too　late　for　the　right　moment。　Sometimes　too　it



happens　as　with　diagrams；　for　there　we　can　sometimes　analyse　the



figure；　but　not　construct　it　again：　so　too　in　refutations；　though　we



know　the　thing　on　which　the　connexion　of　the　argument　depends；　we



still　are　at　a　loss　to　split　the　argument　apart。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　17







　　First　then；　just　as　we　say　that　we　ought　sometimes　to　choose　to



prove　something　in　the　general　estimation　rather　than　in　truth；　so



also　we　have　sometimes　to　solve　arguments　rather　in　the　general



estimation　than　according　to　the　truth。　For　it　is　a　general　rule　in



fighting　contentious　persons；　to　treat　them　not　as　refuting；　but　as



merely　appearing　to　refute：　for　we　say　that　they　don't　really　prove



their　case；　so　that　our　object　in　correcting　them　must　be　to　dispel



the　appearance　of　it。　For　if　refutation　be　an　unambiguous



contradiction　arrived　at　from　certain　views；　there　could　be　no　need　to



draw　distinctions　against　amphiboly　and　ambiguity：　they　do　not



effect　a　proof。　The　only　motive　for　drawing　further　distinctions　is



that　the　conclusion　reached　looks　like　a　refutation。　What；　then；　we



have　to　beware　of；　is　not　being　refuted；　but　seeming　to　be；　because　of



course　the　asking　of　amphibolies　and　of　questions　that　turn　upon



ambiguity；　and　all　the　other　tricks　of　that　kind；　conceal　even　a



genuine　refutation；　and　make　it　uncertain　who　is　refuted　and　who　is



not。　For　since　one　has　the　right　at　the　end；　when　the　conclusion　is



drawn；　to　say　that　the　only　denial　made　of　One's　statement　is



ambiguous；　no　matter　how　precisely　he　may　have　addressed　his



argument　to　the　very　same　point　as　oneself；　it　is　not　clear　whether



one　has　been　refuted：　for　it　is　not　clear　whether　at　the　moment　one　is



speaking　the　truth。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　one　had　drawn　a



distinction；　and　questioned　him　on　the　ambiguous　term　or　the



amphiboly；　the　refutation　would　not　have　been　a　matter　of　uncertainty。



Also　what　is　incidentally　the　object　of　contentious　arguers；　though



less　so　nowadays　than　formerly；　would　have　been　fulfilled；　namely　that



the　person　questioned　should　answer　either　'Yes'　or　'No'：　whereas



nowadays　the　improper　forms　in　which　questioners　put　their　questions



compel　the　party　questioned　to　add　something　to　his　answer　in



correction　of　the　faultiness　of　the　proposition　as　put：　for　certainly；



if　the　questioner　distinguishes　his　meaning　adequately；　the　answerer



is　bound　to　reply　either　'Yes'　or　'No'。



　　If　any　one　is　going　to　suppose　that　an　argument　which　turns　upon



ambiguity　is　a　refutation；　it　will　be　impossible　for　an　answerer　to



escape　being　refuted　in　a　sense：　for　in　the　case　of　visible　objects



one　is　bound　of　necessity　to　deny　the　term　one　has　asserted；　and　to



assert　what　one　has　denied。　For　the　remedy　which　some　people　have



for　this　is　quite　unavailing。　They　say；　not　that　Coriscus　is　both



musical　and　unmusical；　but　that　this　Coriscus　is　musical　and　this



Coriscus　unmusical。　But　this　will　not　do；　for　to　say　'this　Coriscus　is



unmusical'；　or　'musical'；