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on sophistical refutations-第10部分

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commits a solecism; though he does not seem to do so to other



people; where he who calls it a 'destructor' (oulomenon) commits no



solecism though he seems to do so。 It is clear; then; that any one



could produce this effect by art as well: and for this reason many



arguments seem to lead to solecism which do not really do so; as



happens in the case of refutations。



  Almost all apparent solecisms depend upon the word 'this' (tode);



and upon occasions when the inflection denotes neither a masculine nor



a feminine object but a neuter。 For 'he' (outos) signifies a



masculine; and 'she' (aute) feminine; but 'this' (touto); though



meant to signify a neuter; often also signifies one or other of the



former: e。g。 'What is this?' 'It is Calliope'; 'it is a log'; 'it is



Coriscus'。 Now in the masculine and feminine the inflections are all



different; whereas in the neuter some are and some are not。 Often;



then; when 'this' (touto) has been granted; people reason as if 'him'



(touton) had been said: and likewise also they substitute one



inflection for another。 The fallacy comes about because 'this'



(touto) is a common form of several inflections: for 'this' signifies



sometimes 'he' (outos) and sometimes 'him' (touton)。 It should



signify them alternately; when combined with 'is' (esti) it should be



'he'; while with 'being' it should be 'him': e。g。 'Coriscus



(Kopiskos) is'; but 'being Coriscus' (Kopiskon)。 It happens in the



same way in the case of feminine nouns as well; and in the case of the



so…called 'chattels' that have feminine or masculine designations。 For



only those names which end in o and n; have the designation proper



to a chattel; e。g。 xulon ('log'); schoinion ('rope'); those which do



not end so have that of a masculine or feminine object; though some of



them we apply to chattels: e。g。 askos ('wineskin') is a masculine



noun; and kline ('bed') a feminine。 For this reason in cases of this



kind as well there will be a difference of the same sort between a



construction with 'is' (esti) or with 'being' (to einai)。 Also;



Solecism resembles in a certain way those refutations which are said



to depend on the like expression of unlike things。 For; just as



there we come upon a material solecism; so here we come upon a verbal:



for 'man' is both a 'matter' for expression and also a 'word': and



so is white'。



  It is clear; then; that for solecisms we must try to construct our



argument out of the aforesaid inflections。



  These; then; are the types of contentious arguments; and the



subdivisions of those types; and the methods for conducting them



aforesaid。 But it makes no little difference if the materials for



putting the question be arranged in a certain manner with a view to



concealment; as in the case of dialectics。 Following then upon what we



have said; this must be discussed first。







                                15







  With a view then to refutation; one resource is length…for it is



difficult to keep several things in view at once; and to secure length



the elementary rules that have been stated before' should be employed。



One resource; on the other hand; is speed; for when people are left



behind they look ahead less。 Moreover; there is anger and



contentiousness; for when agitated everybody is less able to take care



of himself。 Elementary rules for producing anger are to make a show of



the wish to play foul; and to be altogether shameless。 Moreover; there



is the putting of one's questions alternately; whether one has more



than one argument leading to the same conclusion; or whether one has



arguments to show both that something is so; and that it is not so:



for the result is that he has to be on his guard at the same time



either against more than one line; or against contrary lines; of



argument。 In general; all the methods described before of producing



concealment are useful also for purposes of contentious argument:



for the object of concealment is to avoid detection; and the object of



this is to deceive。



  To counter those who refuse to grant whatever they suppose to help



one's argument; one should put the question negatively; as though



desirous of the opposite answer; or at any rate as though one put



the question without prejudice; for when it is obscure what answer one



wants to secure; people are less refractory。 Also when; in dealing



with particulars; a man grants the individual case; when the induction



is done you should often not put the universal as a question; but take



it for granted and use it: for sometimes people themselves suppose



that they have granted it; and also appear to the audience to have



done so; for they remember the induction and assume that the questions



could not have been put for nothing。 In cases where there is no term



to indicate the universal; still you should avail yourself of the



resemblance of the particulars to suit your purpose; for resemblance



often escapes detection。 Also; with a view to obtaining your



premiss; you ought to put it in your question side by side with its



contrary。 E。g。 if it were necessary to secure the admission that 'A



man should obey his father in everything'; ask 'Should a man obey



his parents in everything; or disobey them in everything?'; and to



secure that 'A number multiplied by a large number is a large number';



ask 'Should one agree that it is a large number or a small one?' For



then; if compelled to choose; one will be more inclined to think it



a large one: for the placing of their contraries close beside them



makes things look big to men; both relatively and absolutely; and



worse and better。



  A strong appearance of having been refuted is often produced by



the most highly sophistical of all the unfair tricks of questioners;



when without proving anything; instead of putting their final



proposition as a question; they state it as a conclusion; as though



they had proved that 'Therefore so…and…so is not true'



  It is also a sophistical trick; when a paradox has been laid down;



first to propose at the start some view that is generally accepted;



and then claim that the answerer shall answer what he thinks about it;



and to put one's question on matters of that kind in the form 'Do



you think that。。。?' For then; if the question be taken as one of the



premisses of one's argument; either a refutation or a paradox is bound



to result; if he grants the view; a refutation; if he refuses to grant



it or even to admit it as the received opinion; a paradox; if he



refuses to grant it; but admits that it is the received opinion;



something very like a refutation; results。



  Moreover; just as in rhetorical discourses; so also in those aimed



at refutation; you should examine the discrepancies of the



answerer's position either with his own statements; or with those of



persons whom he admit
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